Tort Law and the American Economy by Cross, Frank B.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2011
Tort Law and the American Economy
Frank B. Cross
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cross, Frank B., "Tort Law and the American Economy" (2011). Minnesota Law Review. 384.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/384
  
28 
Article 
Tort Law and the American Economy 
Frank B. Cross† 
It is common to hear claims that tort law is undermining 
the ability of America to grow economically. Tort liability im-
poses costs on businesses, who complain about its detrimental 
effects on investment and innovation. While many of these re-
ports are anecdotal, or even false, there is growing evidence on 
the economic effect of tort law. Tort reform proposals are 
pressed, and often passed, on the basis of economic concerns. In 
this narrative, the law is unduly pro-plaintiff, which discourag-
es business investment and innovation and needlessly raises 
the costs of products.1 
Despite these common claims of the economic harms of tort 
law, there is a remarkable paucity of actual study on the ques-
tion. Only very limited research exists on the effects of tort law 
on state economies, and much of that research considers only 
particular tort reforms and not the overall state of a state‘s law. 
Many factors will influence the economies of the various states, 
of which tort law is but one. However, if its economic effect 
were truly profound, one would expect to see some economic 
benefit, on some measure, for states with relatively pro-
defendant tort law. 
I examine the effects of tort law using indices created by 
two pro-defendant organizations, the United States Chamber of 
 
†  Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, McCombs 
School of Business, University of Texas at Austin; Professor of Law, Universi-
ty of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Aus-
tin. Copyright © 2011 by Frank B. Cross. 
 1. Some contend that the stories about the effect of tort law are distorted 
and overblown. See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DIS-
TORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004) (pre-
senting evidence that interest groups and the media have greatly exaggerated 
unrepresentative stories about tort law). However, just as anecdotal evidence 
cannot prove a claim, neither can demonstrating the inaccuracy of such anec-
dotal evidence disprove the claim. 
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Commerce and the Pacific Research Institute. While both 
groups believe that tort law hampers the economy, there is no 
reason to think these organizations should have a bias for or 
against particular states in their rating system, and their posi-
tion on tort law makes their metrics ideal for an independent 
test of tort law‘s effect. 
This study considers those measures of state tort liability 
regimes and economic measures. I consider the often-used 
Chamber of Commerce measure of tort law (a perceptual meas-
ure) and the Pacific Research Institute‘s measure of specific le-
gal doctrines. The findings should significantly inform tort 
reform debates. The primary reason offered for such reform is 
the perceived adverse economic consequences of tort doctrines.2 
A finding that tort law has such adverse effects would therefore 
be important. However, my research finds no such association 
between tort law and economic harm.  
I.  THE CONTROVERSY OVER TORT LAW   
For decades now, a controversy has raged about tort law 
and its economic consequences. Defendants, especially busi-
nesses, complain of excessive, and often unfairly imposed, tort 
liability. The risks of tort liability allegedly include the unjusti-
fied transfer of wealth and the deterrence of valuable economic 
activity.3 
Some argue that ―litigants often exploit the litigation 
process strategically for private gain at the expense of social 
welfare.‖4 Philip K. Howard argues that the law is suffocating 
America.5 While occasional anecdotes about verdicts command 
public attention, the greater cost may be associated with the 
―complexity and expense of settling the vast majority of suits 
 
 2. There are also noneconomic concerns, such as distributional questions. 
See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Demographics of Tort 
Reform, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 591, 593 (2008) (finding that tort reforms had a 
relatively more adverse effect on certain demographic groups, such as women, 
children, and the elderly). However, these concerns could be addressed 
through redistribution of greater wealth if tort reform did indeed produce 
more wealth. 
 3. Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: 
THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 1, 2 (Peter W. Hu-
ber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). 
 4. Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Set-
tlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850 
(2004). 
 5. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUF-
FOCATING AMERICA passim (1994). 
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that never go to trial, the chilling threat of suits over a widen-
ing range of issues, [and] the preparations needed to lessen the 
chances of being sued.‖6 This results in the deployment of 
―larg[e] armies of vigilant lawyers engaged in a kind of legal 
equivalent of [a] defensive cold war.‖7 This obviously comes at a 
cost to the economy.8 
A. ECONOMICS OF TORT LAW 
While tort litigation is commonly considered economically 
harmful, in theory it should be economically beneficial. The 
system is designed to force the internalization of costs imposed 
on others. A business would have less incentive to produce safe 
products if injured parties could not force the business to pay 
for their damages.9 This should cause more efficient product 
decisions, as businesses will not produce products whose harm 
(as measured in tort damages) exceeds their benefits. The eco-
nomic costs associated with dangerous products may be consi-
derable.10 Any failure to internalize these external costs would 
―violate the marginal conditions of optimal resource allocation 
and may become a major cause of inefficiencies.‖11 Tort law 
serves ―social purposes,‖ most prominently the compensation of 
innocent victims and ―deterring behavior that presents risks 
that exceed their social value.‖12 
 
 6. Pietro S. Nivola, American Social Regulation Meets the Global Econo-
my, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES? SOCIAL REGULATIONS AND THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 16, 23 (Pietro S. Nivola ed., 1997). Less obvious costs, such as ef-
fects on morale, hours devoted to recordkeeping, and lack of innovation may 
add ―tens of billions‖ of dollars to the true cost of tort liability in the United 
States. Id. at 34. 
 7. Id. at 23; see also id. at 34 (complaining that ―firms must devote sub-
stantial resources to warding off predators even when no complaint has been 
filed‖ ). 
 8. Id. at 23. 
 9. John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE 
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, 
supra note 3, at 120, 183–84. 
 10. See Sidney Shapiro et al., The Social Costs of Dangerous Products: An 
Empirical Investigation, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 775, 791–829 (2009) 
(considering only three such dangerous products and concluding that they cost 
nearly $5 billion since 1990). 
 11. Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between Private 
Loss and Social Cost, 17 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 589, 589 (1997); see also Shapi-
ro et al., supra note 10, at 777 (describing how the ―tort system improves mar-
ket efficiency by forcing the sellers of dangerous products to pay for costs that 
would otherwise be borne by other parties‖ ). 
 12. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of 
the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1149, 1150 
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Deterrence not only avoids negative accident costs but 
should also expand the number of economic transactions. 
People are relatively more reluctant to buy a product if it is 
more likely to harm them and if they have no recourse should 
such harm occur. Thus, in the ―absence of standards, labels, 
and legal recourse against negligent producers, people might 
decline to purchase drugs, foods, and other consumer goods at 
prices that reflect their real economic value.‖13 This would have 
the effect of decreasing economic activity and economic growth. 
The expected economic benefits of tort law (beyond simply 
compensating deserving victims) stem largely from deterring 
the imposition of external costs on others for no compensation, 
such as by causing physical harm.14 The success of this deter-
rence is subject to empirical dispute. Some ―studies of particu-
lar industries have found little evidence that American tort law 
consistently or significantly affects product design or safety.‖15 
However, some tort reforms in the area of medical malpractice 
apparently have resulted in an increase in medical misbeha-
vior.16 Surveys of companies show a substantial number report-
ing that product liability law had induced them to improve the 
safety of their products.17 Unfortunately, numerous factors out-
 
(1992). The classic explication of these effects is discussed in GUIDO CALABRE-
SI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970) 
(suggesting that ―the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of 
the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents‖ ). 
 13. Nivola, supra note 6, at 31. 
 14. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The 
Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910–11 
(2008) (describing the theory of deterrence benefits). 
 15. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LAW 142 (2001). There is no association of insurance premiums and injury 
rates. George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIA-
BILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184, 186 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Wins-
ton eds., 1988). Nor was there a association between times of increased tort 
liability and changes in injury and death rates. Id. at 194. This research is 
more ―exploratory‖ than conclusive, however, and failed to ―distinguish other 
factors‖ that could be relevant to the findings. Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 6. 
 16. See Claudia E. Lavenant et al., Tort Reform and Physician Sanction-
ing, 24 LAW & POL‘Y 1, 10 tbl.1 (2002) (finding a correlation between joint-
liability reform and higher rates of serious sanctions). 
 17. DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAK-
ING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 199 (1996) (reporting that 35% of companies had 
improved the safety of their products and 47% had improved product usage 
and warranties as a result of product liability law). 
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side the tort liability system influence product safety, making it 
difficult to isolate the effect of the law.18 
At some level, the deterrence is simply logical economics. 
Those who must pay more for a given product (injuring others) 
will buy less of that product. The clearest evidence of this 
comes from the field of auto insurance. Some governments have 
eliminated traditional liability insurance in favor of no-fault 
systems in which compensation is unhinged from tortious be-
havior. A number of studies have found that this switch was 
accompanied by a statistically significant increase in auto acci-
dents or fatalities.19 As injuring others became cheap, there 
were more injuries. Similar results have been found for the ef-
fect of dram shop laws.20 At least major tort law changes clearly 
show the expected deterrent value of tort liability.21 
 
 18. Much product safety comes from consumer preferences and firms‘ rep-
utations. Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 22 (calling this the ―principal impe-
tus for developing and producing safe products‖). Other factors include ―moral 
principles discouraging people from needlessly inflicting risk and harm on 
others, the risk of hazardous behavior for the acting party‘s own safety, mar-
ket forces driving unsafe products out or internalizing job hazards in wage dif-
ferentials, and the regulatory programs put in place by the government.‖ Ben 
C.J. van Velthoven, Empirics of Tort, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 453, 454 
(Michael Faure ed., 2009). An examination of these other factors in the context 
of automobile safety concluded that product liability was not strictly ―neces-
sary‖ to safety improvements, but that it was ―often a sufficient or contribut-
ing cause of safety improvements.‖ Graham, supra note 9. In addition, various 
government agencies also regulate the safety of many products and prevent 
the sale of unsafe products. Nicholas A. Ashford & Robert F. Stone, Liability, 
Innovation, and Safety in the Chemical Industry, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE 
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note 3, at 367, 
370. 
 19. See J. David Cummins et al., The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Auto-
mobile Insurance, 44 J.L. & ECON. 427, 454–55 (2001) (finding association of 
no-fault systems and higher fatality rates in the United States); Elisabeth M. 
Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical In-
vestigation of the Effects of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 49–50 
(1982) (finding increased accident losses in no-fault states in America); R. Ian 
McEwin, No-Fault and Road Accidents: Some Australasian Evidence, 9 INT‘L 
REV. L. & ECON. 13, 14 (1989) (confirming this effect in New Zealand); Mar-
shall H. Medoff & Joseph P. Magaddino, An Empirical Analysis of No-Fault 
Insurance, 6 EVALUATION REV. 373, 388 (1982) (identifying no-fault laws as a 
significant factor in state loss ratios); Peter L. Swan, The Economics of Law: 
Economic Imperialism in Negligence Law, No-Fault Insurance, Occupational 
Licensing and Criminology, AUSTL. ECON. REV., 3d Quarter 1984, at 92, 100 
(identifying increased accident and injury risks in New Zealand). 
 20. See, e.g., Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Alcohol-Control Policies and Mo-
tor-Vehicle Fatalities, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 184 (1993); Lan Liang et al., 
Precaution, Compensation, and Threats of Sanction: The Case of Alcohol Serv-
ers, 24 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 49, 67–68 (2004); Kathryn Whetten-Goldstein et 
al., Civil Liability, Criminal Law, and Other Policies and Alcohol-Related Mo-
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A recent study of malpractice liability22 may provide the 
most convincing evidence of tort costs and benefits. The authors 
of this study used the generosity of local juries as their measure 
of tort liability.23 They found that a 10% reduction in malprac-
tice costs would reduce Medicare health care expenditures by at 
most 1.2%, but that a 10% increase in malpractice costs would 
reduce mortality by about 0.2%.24 Given the value of a life, the 
net effect of malpractice liability is probably positive. Moreover, 
the authors considered only mortality;25 assuming that a simi-
lar effect would apply to morbidity, the benefits of malpractice 
law would be still greater. This analysis was only one study, 
though, and limited to medical malpractice. 
Indeed, there is an argument that there is not enough tort 
law in America and that economic inefficiency results from in-
sufficient liability. A very small percentage of injured Ameri-
cans file suit, even when another party may be responsible.26 
Considerable research in the area of medical malpractice shows 
that most parties with legitimate cases took no legal action.27 
An insufficient number of filed claims could also lead to an in-
adequate amount of deterrence, and some suggest the real ―tort 
crisis‖ is that ―too few victims claim.‖28 In addition, when suits 
 
tor Vehicle Fatalities in the United States: 1984–1995, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
& PREVENTION 723, 729–32 (2000). 
 21. For a good summary of the research on the deterrent effect of tort law, 
see van Velthoven, supra note 18. 
 22. Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, The Welfare Effects of Med-
ical Malpractice Liability (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
15,383, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15383.pdf. 
 23. Id. at 3. 
 24. Id. at 4. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Only about ten percent of those who suffer from accidents file suit. See 
DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 110 (1991).  
 27. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation 
and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1089–91 
(2006) (summarizing studies to this effect). Two examples are Lori Andrews, 
Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law and Policy, 
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 370 (2005) (reporting that just over one percent of pa-
tients who suffered a medical error filed suit), and David M. Studdert et al., 
Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 
MED. CARE 250, 250 (2000) (reporting that 97% of those patients who suffered 
a negligent injury did not sue). 
 28. Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 443, 447, 460 (1987) (emphasis added); see also Saks, supra note 12, at 
1183–89 (summarizing research to this effect). 
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are filed and won, the amount of damages may be unduly low.29 
Thus, the economic problems with our tort system may be the 
opposite of those commonly claimed. The safety problems asso-
ciated with chemicals may be ascribed to this insufficiency of 
litigation.30 
Theoretically, a good tort system should be economically 
beneficial. The conservative, pro-tort reform public interest or-
ganization, the Pacific Research Institute, explained: 
An efficient tort system is an important part of a thriving free-
enterprise economy. It ensures that firms have proper incentives to 
produce safe products in a safe environment, and that truly injured 
people are fully compensated. An efficient tort system results in 
greater trust among market participants, leading to more trading, 
and eventually a higher standard of living for individuals in the socie-
ty. An efficient tort system benefits all. 
  A poor tort system, on the other hand, imposes excessive costs on 
society, not the least of which is foregone production of goods and ser-
vices. There is growing evidence that U.S. tort costs are far greater 
than other countries‘ costs and that much of the difference is due to 
excessive litigation and lawsuit abuse. All of us shoulder the burden 
of an excessively expensive and inefficient tort liability system 
through higher prices, lower wages, decreased returns on investment 
in capital and land, restricted access to health care, and less innova-
tion.31 
Tort law is not per se harmful to the economy, but an inef-
ficient tort system is. Therefore, the question is whether the 
American system is, as PRI claims, unduly pro-plaintiff and 
imposing excessive costs, or if it is more reasonable and effi-
cient, producing net benefits to society. Originally, many 
thought that ―judge-made rules tend to be efficiency-
 
 29. Most malpractice actions containing strong legal claims receive much 
less than full compensation of even their economic losses. KAGAN, supra note 
15, at 140. A study of dangerous products found that tort compensation was 
less than the actual costs of those products. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Dimin-
ished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and 
Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 95–97 (1989) 
(reporting that the amounts of judgments and settlements in product liability 
litigation was often less than the actual losses suffered by the victim). Com-
pensation awarded in wrongful death actions is much less than the amount 
that economists have calculated as the reasonable value of a life. See Frank 
Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1916–
23 (2006). 
 30. See Ashford & Stone, supra note 18, at 367 (finding the liability from 
torts well below the benchmark for optimal deterrence of harms). 
 31. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABIL-
ITY INDEX: 2008 REPORT 1 (2008), available at http://www.pacificresearch.org/ 
docLib/20080222_2008_US_Tort_Liability_Index.pdf. 
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promoting.‖32 The basic theory is that the common law evolves 
through litigated cases, though many claims are settled.33 
When a rule is inefficient, creating deadweight losses, there is a 
greater incentive to litigate to have it overturned.34 Given 
enough challenges, the inefficient rule will be changed, while 
efficient rules are less likely to be litigated.35 This process 
steers the common law in the direction of greater economic effi-
ciency.36 Some have even maintained that ―[c]ommon law does 
not fit in a rent-seeking world.‖37 
The notion of common law efficiency has come under consi-
derable criticism, however. Judges see only a small number of 
cases applying a rule, and the cases they see may well be unre-
presentative.38 Barriers to efficiency include the stickiness of 
legal rules and the fact that rules of law are public goods in 
which we can expect litigants to under-invest.39 Given the path 
dependence of precedent,40 an inefficient rule may be amplified 
as it is increasingly litigated.41 
Public choice analysis, commonly applied to legislative 
analysis, can also be applied to judicial decision making, and 
may seriously undermine claims of economically efficient legal 
evolution. Repeat players, such as large companies, may mani-
pulate their settlement practices so as to channel the law in a 
 
 32. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 523 (4th ed. 1992). 
 33. See, e.g., George Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of 
Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65–66 (1977). 
 34. Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
51, 61 (1977). 
 35. See, e.g., John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of 
the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 393–94 (1978); Priest, supra note 33, 
at 75; Rubin, supra note 34. 
 36. Goodman, supra note 35, at 394; Priest, supra note 33, at 81; Rubin, 
supra note 34, at 61. 
 37. Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Mod-
ern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 956 (1999). 
 38. See generally Gillian Hadfield, Biases in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 
80 GEO. L.J. 583, 605–14 (1992) (discussing the effect of restricted information 
on judicial efficiency). 
 39. Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: 
Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 429 (2005). 
 40. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 941 (2005). ―Path dependence‖ refers to the ―history of 
problems that had to be solved in the past but that may be irrelevant today.‖ 
Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996). 
 41. See Hirsch, supra note 39, at 428 (―[T]he doctrine of precedent stacks 
the adversarial deck against a party who seeks to revise a rule, whether or not 
the existing rule is efficient.‖). 
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direction favorable to their future liability risks.42 The evolu-
tion of nuisance law to favor industrial polluters has been cited 
as an example of this effect.43 Such precedent purchasing 
through litigation would undermine an efficient common law of 
tort, presumably making the law unduly pro-defendant. The 
―haves‖ would tend to come out ahead in court battles.44 Insofar 
as this effect operates, it suggests that tort law is doing too lit-
tle to internalize externalities. 
Some have argued that plaintiffs‘ lawyers engage in simi-
lar practices to expand tort liability law. Todd Zywicki argues 
that the ―driving force behind many of the innovations in tort 
law in recent decades has been the plaintiffs‘ bar, pushing for 
expansion of liability under the tort system as well as increas-
ing complexity in the tort system.‖45 Defense lawyers have no 
economic incentive to counteract this effect, because they too 
profit from additional litigation.46 Judges may be complicit in 
these efforts.47 This process has allegedly ―made a mockery of 
the law and has eliminated a wide range of otherwise viable 
goods and services from the American marketplace.‖48 
The empirical evidence supporting this claim is limited. 
One study examined the development of the abolition of privity 
doctrine for product liability and attributed it to rent-seeking 
 
 42. See Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS 
L.J. 355, 366–68 (1999) (discussing the possibility of ―precedent-purchasing‖). 
 43. See Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 
205, 216–17 (1982).  
 44. See Marc Galanter, Why the ―Haves‖ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 95, 123–24 (1974). 
 45. Todd Zywicki, Public Choice and Tort Reform 4 (George Mason Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 00-36, 2000), available at http:// 
www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/00-36.pdf?q=avoiding 
-tort-liability-avoiding-tort-liability-what-works; see also Paul H. Rubin & 
Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 807, 808 (1994) (claiming that the ―shape of modern product liability 
law is due to the interests of tort lawyers‖). 
 46. Zywicki, supra note 45, at 6–7. Richard Epstein has suggested that it 
is ―in the interest of defendant firms to have a pro-plaintiff set of rules, which 
makes their own defensive efforts worthwhile for the manufacturers that hire 
them.‖ Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 
78 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 313 (1988). Legal academics may also share culpabili-
ty in this process. See Zywicki, supra note 45, at 19–22. 
 47. See Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientif-
ic Evidence: Tort System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers’ 
Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1793 (1994) (arguing that ―policy-
oriented jurists‖ have a ―symbiotic relationship‖ with plaintiffs‘ attorneys). 
 48. GORDON TULLOCK, THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON LAW 52 (The 
Locke Institute, The Blackstone Commentaries No. 1, 1997). 
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litigation by tort lawyers.49 Another found that states with 
more lawyers were quicker to abandon contributory negligence 
in favor of comparative negligence.50 Both studies have serious 
shortcomings, not least that the new pro-plaintiff documents 
seem more economically efficient.51 The research did not effec-
tively distinguish between judicial and legislative adoption of 
doctrines, however, and study of additional doctrines did not 
confirm the results.52 
Additionally, even if the rules of tort law were efficient, the 
system could still fail in practice.53 The ―performance of the lia-
bility system quickly becomes theoretically ambiguous if the 
system imposes transactions costs or erroneously assigns liabil-
ity.‖54 It may be that the costs of operating the tort law system 
are so great that they outweigh any practical economic benefits. 
Litigation costs themselves are great and may equal or even 
exceed the amount paid out to deserving plaintiffs.55 The high 
transaction costs may also distort payments. Defendants may 
choose to settle wholly illegitimate claims simply because the 
costs of litigation exceeded the settlement payments.56 
 
 49. Rubin & Bailey, supra note 45. 
 50. Christopher Curran, The Spread of the Comparative Negligence Rule 
in the United States, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 317, 327 (1992). 
 51. See Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doc-
trinal Evolution, 45 EMORY L.J. 523, 574–75 (1996) (citing research to this ef-
fect). 
 52. Id. at 575–79. 
 53. See Huber & Litan, supra note 3 (noting that ―[r]egardless of its net 
overall effects, the tort system may still be inefficient‖ because of the costs of 
administering it). 
 54. DANIEL P. KESSLER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE LIABILITY SYS-
TEM 4 (The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Essays in Public 
Policy No. 91, 1999). 
 55. See Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the ―Crisis‖ in the Civil Justice System 
Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (2005) (reporting that 
plaintiffs were ―receiving less than 50% of the money spent on litigation‖); Joni 
Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial 
Claims, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 330, 330 (2007) (reporting that total transac-
tion costs for each dollar received by claimants reach $0.83 in cases where a 
suit was filed with an attorney). 
 56. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value 
Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 
1857 (2004) (discussing this problem). However, the materiality of such nui-
sance settlements is unknown. Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement 
―Problem‖: The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL AD-
VOC. 221, 224 (2007). 
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The transaction costs of tort litigation exceed those of al-
ternative compensation schemes like workers‘ compensation.57 
On the other hand, the cheaper schemes generally do not at-
tempt to distinguish between deserving and undeserving in-
jured parties, sacrificing the efficiency advantages of tort law. 
The costs are associated primarily with this differentiation and 
may therefore be useful.58 Screening out bad claims is key to 
the law and its efficiency. Studying this effect, Charles Silver 
found no evidence that alternative dispute resolution systems 
were more efficient and concluded that the tort litigation sys-
tem operated efficiently.59 In any event, the high administra-
tive costs of the tort law system must be considered when as-
sessing its economic effect. 
Tort law may fail to efficiently apportion liability because 
each case is so unique. There is a contention that whether a 
tort plaintiff is compensated ―in a product liability case depends 
on various matters of chance such as the relative skills of the 
attorneys on each side, the composition of the jury, and the tim-
ing of case resolution relative to the timing of information 
about injury causation coming to light.‖60 Random variation in 
numerous surrounding facts could produce inefficient results 
even with an efficient set of legal standards.61 If so, the tort 
system could function inefficiently, much like a lottery,62 
though some suggest this is unlikely.63 Consequently, one must 
 
 57. See 1 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS‘ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILI-
TY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 119 (1991) (suggesting that workers‘ compensation 
administrative costs are only 15–20% of overall payouts, while the tort sys-
tem‘s costs are 50–55%). 
 58. Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
2073, 2078–80 (2002). 
 59. See id. at 2106–07 (finding that without ADR, litigants in the existing 
tort system ―are minimizing litigation costs on their own‖). 
 60. Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Deci-
sions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 291 n.138. 
 61. See Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 21 (claiming that ―the uncertainty 
of the tort system is its greatest vice, magnifying risks of liability while dis-
connecting them from unduly risky conduct‖). 
 62. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan & Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed., Heal the 
Law, Then Health Care, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at B7 (commenting that 
―[t]he legal system today is a string of ad hoc decisions‖ and ―[ j]ustice . . . is 
basically random‖). 
 63. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 27, at 1086–87 (characterizing the 
liability system as a market of ―sophisticated, economically-oriented repeat 
players‖ who ―have the knowledge and incentives to select efficient means to 
accomplish their respective ends‖ and noting that ―[g]iven this backdrop, their 
behavior and the behavior of the system . . . should not be random‖). The au-
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consider both the substantive rules of tort law and procedural 
factors in evaluating the American tort liability system.  
It is possible that, notwithstanding all these limitations on 
the efficiency of tort litigation, it could still be economically 
beneficial. Tort law can be a substitute for government regula-
tion and international comparisons have found this to be the 
case.64 When compared with legislative solutions, ―litigation 
may in fact be an efficient means of resolving social conflicts.‖65 
More pro-defendant tort law regimes could be associated with 
more aggressive regulatory regimes, and reliance on tort litiga-
tion may be economically beneficial. 
B. TORT COSTS 
As noted above, there is a widespread belief that the tort 
system imposes unfair costs on defendants, creating economic 
inefficiency and harming society at large. Some researchers 
have sought to measure these costs and quantify their magni-
tude. 
Pacific Research Institute (PRI) recently alleged that ex-
cessive tort costs in the United States amount to $589 billion 
per year.66 This estimate, though, is simply a comparison of the 
estimated costs of torts in the United States with those of other 
advanced countries.67 This is an unreliable measure, because 
tort law plays different roles in different nations.68 In the Unit-
ed States, tort costs may be higher because the direct govern-
ment regulatory system (with criminal enforcement) in this na-
tion is smaller, with more reliance placed on civil justice 
 
thors suggest that empirical studies of the system show it to be ―stable and pre-
dictable‖ and able to sort ―valid from invalid claims reasonably well.‖ Id. at 1087. 
 64. KAGAN, supra note 15, at 126–28. 
 65. Tonja Jacobi, The Role of Politics and Economics in Explaining Varia-
tion in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206 (2009). 
 66. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN ET AL., PAC. RESEARCH INST., JACKPOT JUS-
TICE: THE TRUE COST OF AMERICA‘S TORT SYSTEM xiii (2007). This study came 
under considerable criticism, though. See Tom Baker, Herbert Kritzer & Neil 
Vidmar, Jackpot Justice and the American Tort System: Thinking Beyond 
Junk Science 2, 3 (William Mitchell Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 95, July 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1152306 
(contending that the report was advocacy disguised as science); Richard Posn-
er, Is the Tort System Costing the United States $865 Billion a Year?, THE 
BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Apr. 1, 2007, 7:22 PM), http://www.becker-posner 
-blog.com/2007/04/is-the-tort-system-costing-the-united-states-865-billion-a 
-year--posner.html (identifying various errors in the study methodology). 
 67. See Baker, Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 66, at 8. 
 68. See id. 
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through torts.69 Robert Kagan has demonstrated this interna-
tional effect, with an argument that America should rely more 
on regulation and less on tort litigation.70 This may be true, but 
it means that the net costs of tort law cannot be measured 
across countries because they have different institutions de-
voted to achieving the accident-reducing goal of tort law and 
the data to make such a comparison does not exist. 
Another study, by the Council of Economic Advisers under 
President George W. Bush, put the annual direct costs of the 
tort litigation system at $180 billion (1.8% of GDP), 
representing a functional tax of 2% on consumption, 3% on 
wages, or 5% on capital income.71 This analysis made no at-
 
 69. See KAGAN, supra note 15, at 127–28. 
 70. Id. at 126–55; see also Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote 
to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1141 (1996) (emphasizing that unlike the 
other nations studied, ―we do not have an administrative state with intensive 
governmental regulation of risks, nor do we have a comprehensive welfare 
state‖). The lessened tort liability in other nations may be due to factors such 
as public entitlements or alternative compensation systems. WERNER PFEN-
NIGSTORF & DONALD J. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW 
AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 
160 (1991); see also Baker, Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 66, at 9 (observing 
that ―[o]ther countries have stronger regulatory mechanisms that eliminate 
the need for some types of tort claims‖ or have ―[s]ocial welfare systems [that] 
may reduce the need to rely upon tort claims for support and compensation 
after injury‖). 
 71. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS? 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 1 (2002). These 
estimates came from TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2000, 
TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON THE COSTS OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM (2002). The 
Council of Economic Advisers recognizes that not all these costs are excessive 
but estimates that $136 billion of them are. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, su-
pra at 10. Although it was relied upon by President Bush‘s Council of Econom-
ic Advisers, the reliability and accuracy of the Tillinghast estimates have been 
criticized. See, e.g., Baker, Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 66, at 4 (suggesting 
that ―regulators deliberately designed the reporting system to require the in-
surance industry to err on the high side‖ and that a third of the costs were 
based on malpractice and self-insured expenditures ―for which there [were] no 
reliable, publicly available data‖); Lawrence Chimerine & Ross Eisenbrey, The 
Frivolous Case for Tort Law Change: Opponents of the Legal System Exagger- 
rate Its Costs, Ignore Its Benefits 2–3 (Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper No. 
157, 2005) (noting that the study disregarded benefits, exaggerated costs, 
showed no correlation with economic outcomes, included the insurance indus-
try‘s own administrative expenses, and included other flawed costs). Other re-
search has concluded that the cost of insuring products liability is only about 
0.2% of corporate revenues. CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR 
AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 
219 (2001).  
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tempt to consider the countervailing economic benefits asso-
ciated with tort litigation, however.72 
Critics of the tort system often characterize the costs of lit-
igation as a ―tort tax.‖73 The former board chairman of Home 
Depot complained that a ―tort tax‖ cost every American $2400 
per year.74 One writer opined in the Wall Street Journal that 
tort costs represented over 2% of the gross national product and 
would amount to $4.8 trillion over a ten year period.75 A later 
opinion piece updated this figure to estimate the cost of torts at 
over $865 billion per year.76  
There are some obvious flaws in these cost estimates for 
the tort system. In addition to failing to consider the benefits of 
tort litigation, such measures of cost make the economic mis-
take of conflating an economic transfer with an economic cost. 
This money expended on the tort system is not lost to society, 
but simply transferred to other parties (from defendants to 
plaintiffs, lawyers, and others who gain from the system). 
When a verdict transfers money to a plaintiff, that event is a 
cost to the defendant but not directly to society. Society has the 
same wealth, some of it is simply held in different hands.77 ―Be-
cause the tort action results in a direct transfer payment, there 
is no deadweight loss in the economic analysis model . . . .‖78 
Of course, some transfer payments may result in dead-
weight loss. If money is transferred from a person who would 
 
 72. Chimerine & Eisenbrey, supra note 71. 
 73. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 3–5 (1988). Over twenty years ago, Peter Huber claimed the 
existence of such a tort tax was harming the United States‘ commercial com-
petitiveness. Id. at 228–30. 
 74. See Editorial, A Barrister ’s Baloney, INVESTOR‘S BUS. DAILY (L.A.), 
Dec. 5, 2008, at A10. 
 75. Jim Copland, Op-Ed., The Tort Tax, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003, at A10. 
 76. Lawrence J. McQuillan & Hovannes Abramyan, Op-Ed., The Tort Tax, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2007, at A18. 
 77. This distinction is often discussed in antitrust law, where economists 
typically do not regard the excess profits of a monopolist as an economic loss to 
society. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Mono-
polies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 505 (observing that ―antitrust economists are 
generally agnostic about these wealth transfers‖); Oliver E. Williamson, Econ-
omies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 711 (1977) 
(suggesting that the ―transformation of benefits from one form (consumers‘ 
surplus) to another (profit) is treated as a wash under the conventional wel-
fare economics model‖).  
 78. Donald V. Macdougall, The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives—
Remedies for Constitutional Violations in Canada and the United States, 76 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 608, 644 (1985). 
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use it more efficiently to one who would use it less efficiently, 
there is some deadweight loss. More relevant to tort law, if the 
law over-deters, it may prevent the introduction of useful prod-
ucts, which could produce a net loss to society.79 Of course, if 
the law under-deters, the social loss comes from insufficient 
tort liability and inefficient allocation of risk.80 The point is 
that one cannot simply use the amount of tort liability pay-
ments as a measure of the system‘s economic costs. The true 
cost estimates come in the form of indirect effects on society, 
positive or negative. 
One central indirect effect is on product innovation and de-
velopment.81 Defenders of the tort system argue that it offers a 
great benefit by encouraging safer products, as business seeks 
to avoid the costs of liability associated with producing a less 
safe product.82 A model system would require manufacturers to 
internalize the external harms caused by their business. How-
ever, critics of the tort system contend that it actually discou-
rages innovation and new products.83 While an optimal tort lia-
bility system should encourage efficient innovation, ―unchecked 
and unbalanced tort law can limit the availability of necessary 
medical services, discourage innovation, lead to the removal of 
useful and safe products and devices from the marketplace, and 
increase costs to consumers.‖84 Some suggest that ―the broad 
and unpredictable sweep of U.S. liability law deters innova-
tion.‖85 There are numerous examples of various products, in-
 
 79. See Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Funda-
mental Principles Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 647 (2003). 
 80. Cf. R. William Ide III, The Role of the Justice System in the Product 
Liability Debate, in PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN 
AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 37, 43 (Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor O. Jones 
eds., 1994) (describing American‘s product liability system as a competitive 
advantage in the global marketplace when ―it provides a fair, open system in 
which consumers with legitimate claims can be protected while also shielding 
manufacturers against unwarranted claims‖). 
 81. Such innovation is generally regarded as crucial to economic well-
being. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 285, 286 (2008). See generally DAVID WARSH, KNOWLEDGE AND 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: A STORY OF ECONOMIC DISCOVERY (2006) (address-
ing the importance of innovation to economic growth). 
 82. Ide, supra note 80, at 40–41. 
 83. La Fetra, supra note 79. 
 84. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Fostering Mutual Respect and Cooperation 
Between State Courts and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort 
Tug of War, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000). 
 85. Huber & Litan, supra note 3. 
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cluding medical advances, that were not introduced because of 
liability fears.86 
For the critics of our current system, even ―the prospect of 
tort liability . . . inhibits innovation.‖87 The theory is that liabil-
ity is so costly and unpredictable that companies will shun new 
product development out of fear for future unforeseen liability. 
Michael Porter contends that our system of product liability ―is 
so extreme and uncertain as to retard innovation.‖88 Some 
products are occasionally cited in support of this contention, 
such as vaccines and small aircraft production.89 A Conference 
Board survey has reported that some businesses have aban-
doned new products because of liability fears,90 though some 
caution is warranted in interpreting survey results.91 
Yet others argue that the threat of tort liability has served 
its purpose in deterring unsafe product innovation.92 Benjamin 
Barton examined playground design as an example of the 
 
 86. See id. at 7. 
 87. La Fetra, supra note 79, at 646; see also Richard J. Mahoney & Ste-
phen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New Prod-
ucts, 246 SCI. 1395, 1395–96 (1989) (blaming the threat of punitive damages 
for discouraging new product innovation); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 
81, at 286 (contending that tort law‘s reliance on custom as a standard has the 
effect of discouraging innovation). 
 88. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 649 
(1990); see also Man C. Maloo & Benjamin A. Neil, Products Liability Expo-
sure: The Sacrifice of American Innovation, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 361, 362 (1991) 
(contending that ―[t]he fear of products liability lawsuits, and a legal system 
which encourages their institution and permits huge damage awards, are hav-
ing a chilling effect on technological innovation‖); Dick Thornburgh, America’s 
Civil Justice Dilemma: The Prospects for Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1074, 1078 
(1996) (arguing that ―[t]he threat of liability has significantly inhibited the 
product development and innovation needed to provide improved services to 
consumers and to assure a leadership role . . . worldwide‖). 
 89. See, e.g., Bruce E. Peterman, General Aviation Engineering in a Prod-
uct Liability Environment, in PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAG-
ING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT, supra note 80, at 62, 62–67 (small 
aircraft); John P. Wilson, The Resolution of Legal Impediments to the Manu-
facture and Administration of an AIDS Vaccine, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495, 
504 (1994) (vaccines). 
 90. E. PATRICK MCGUIRE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 17–18 (The 
Conference Bd., Research Reports No. 908, 1988). 
 91. See Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that survey respondents, 
―especially top-level corporate officials, can be quick to blame external forces 
for problems arising elsewhere‖). 
 92. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON 
REG. 137, 148–70 (1995) (arguing that the existing tort liability structure pro-
vides appropriate safety incentives for future innovation). 
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threat of tort liability producing valuable innovation.93 Viscusi 
and Moore have conducted analyses that generally show that at 
lower product liability costs, innovation is encouraged but that 
unusually high costs can deter valuable innovation.94 One 
study, though, compared tort costs as a percentage of GDP and 
overall research and development spending and found no corre-
lation between the two.95 
Another commonly invoked cost of the tort system is inter-
national competitiveness.96 The unusually high liability costs of 
the American system purportedly make our products less able 
to compete with the output of other countries with less intru-
sive systems of tort law.97 The infamous Texaco/Pennzoil deci-
sion alone reportedly harmed our competitiveness by increasing 
the costs of doing business, inhibiting business transactions, 
and creating uncertainty.98 
A survey of senior executives found that a majority be-
lieved that ―the U.S. civil justice system significantly hampers 
the ability of U.S. companies to compete with Japanese and 
European companies.‖99 The Commerce Department has re-
ported that ―[f]ear of litigation is among the top issues listed by 
senior executives who manage internationally owned U.S. 
businesses.‖100 Studies by Eurochambres and the Organization 
 
 93. Benjamin H. Barton, Tort Reform, Innovation, and Playground De-
sign, 58 FLA. L. REV. 265, 270 (2006). 
 94. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research and 
Development, and Innovation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 161, 161–64 (1993). 
 95. Chimerine & Eisenbrey, supra note 71, at 10.  
 96. See, e.g., Ji Yao Shen et al., Challenges Facing U.S. Manufacturing 
and Strategies, 23 J. INDUS. TECH., Apr.–Oct. 2007, at 1, 5 (declaring that the 
American ―tort system undermines the competitiveness of U.S. manufactur-
ers‖); Philip Shuchman, It Isn’t that the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It’s Just 
that the Tort Reformers Are So Wrong, 49 RUTGERS L.J. 485, 504 (1997) (not-
ing that ―[m]any concerned groups, public and private, claim that U.S. product 
liability laws are a significant factor and sometimes the most important cause 
of what is perceived as a decline in the competitiveness of U.S. firms in the in-
ternational market‖). 
 97. See Thornburgh, supra note 88, at 1077–78. 
 98. John Diebold, The Texaco-Pennzoil Aftershocks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
1988, at A19 (examining the effects of the decision allowing a $10.53 billion 
tort award in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)). 
 99. The Verdict from the Corner Office, BUS. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 66, 66. 
However, another survey of risk managers of major American companies 
found that ―the impact of the liability issue seems far more related to rhetoric 
than to reality.‖ NATHAN WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RE-
SPONSE 2 (The Conference Bd., Research Reports No. 893, 1987). 
 100. U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, THE U.S. LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT AND 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 2 (2008). 
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for International Investment likewise found concern over tort 
liability among international investors, who cited it as a draw-
back to investing in the United States.101 However, the actual 
effects of tort litigation are uncertain, and there is little reliable 
evidence on this issue.102 
The costs of the alleged tort tax may also be exaggerated. 
One thorough study estimated that the average cost was ―at 
most . . . as high as 2 percent of the cost of all products and ser-
vices sold in the United States,‖103 and the author found no ma-
terial association between liability costs and exports among the 
seven industries studied.104 Similarly, the Commerce Depart-
ment observed that foreign investment in this country surged 
at a time when tort costs as a percentage of GDP were at their 
peak.105 It appears that greater liability ―might sharpen, rather 
than blunt, the competitive edge of U.S. producers,‖ as their 
products had an enhanced reputation for quality.106 
Moreover, to evaluate the costs of the tort tax internation-
ally, one must consider the benefits of tort litigation.107 The net 
costs of any tort tax must also be reduced by actual taxes col-
lected by other nations in their public compensation systems 
that replace tort law. Ultimately the research on the economic 
effect of the United States tort liability system is indetermi-
nate, unless these effects are considered. 
C. THE ECONOMICS OF TORT LAW IN COURTS AND THE 
LEGISLATURE 
The concern over the economic effects of tort law has found 
its way into some judicial decisions. Justice Ketchum of the 
West Virginia Supreme Court has argued that medical moni-
 
 101. Id. at 5–6. 
 102. See id. at 10 (noting that ―not enough evidence or research currently 
exists to determine the litigation environment‘s actual effects‖ on foreign di-
rect investment, so that ―additional quantitative data is needed to guide poli-
cymakers‖). 
 103. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Perfor-
mance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 128–
29 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). 
 104. Id. at 143. 
 105. U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, supra note 100, at 11.  
 106. Nivola, supra note 6, at 36. 
 107. See PORTER, supra note 88 (noting that product liability ―can benefit 
competitive advantage by acting like a sophisticated buyer to encourage the 
development of better products‖). Porter believes, though, that the U.S. system 
fails to achieve this benefit because product liability litigation is excessive. Id. 
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toring claims could leave the state‘s ―economy in shambles.‖108 
This was simply an impressionistic evaluation, though, that did 
not use the research on the economic effects of tort law. 
The research on economic effects has been invoked in some 
recent opinions. Courts have been loath to rely directly upon 
this research, considering this a ―policy dispute[].‖109 More fre-
quently, courts have deferred to the legislature‘s findings on 
the economic research. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted 
that the legislature reasonably used studies from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, the Council of Economic Advi-
sors, and Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, as well as a Harris poll 
and testimony from a state officer when finding that tort litiga-
tion represented ―a challenge to the economy.‖110 
This sort of economic research should be relevant to the 
state of tort law. Although it is not the only factor (matters of 
distributive justice may be considered), economic consequences 
surely are relevant to at least legislative action. Concerns over 
economic and other external effects have influenced the tort 
reform movement in state legislatures. Moreover, such prag-
matic concerns may influence the judiciary, even if they are not 
expressly relied upon in opinions.111 Hence, the evaluation of 
economic effects may be legally salient. 
II.  RESEARCH ON TORT LAW AND THE ECONOMY   
If the tort litigation climate in a given state significantly 
affects economic performance, then one would expect that the 
tort litigation climate should have an effect on business deci-
sions. The business consultants at McKinsey & Co. have re-
ported that ―tort risks are second in importance in deciding 
where to establish operations.‖112 The Chamber of Commerce 
reported that as many as 82 percent of survey respondents said 
 
 108. Perrine v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815, 918 (W. 
Va. 2010) (Ketchum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 109. Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 140 (Utah 2004); see also Lebron v. Got-
tlieb Mem‘l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 919 (Ill. 2010) (finding that ―[p]ublic policy 
determinations of this kind are ultimately a matter for the legislature‖). 
 110. Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 434 (Ohio 2007) (quot-
ing 2004 Ohio Laws 8,024). 
 111. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230 (2008) (suggesting 
that most judges are pragmatists in practice). 
 112. Lawrence J. McQuillan & Mark Kriss, Op-Ed., To Revive New York’s 
Economy, Attack Lawsuit Abuse, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www 
.nydailynews.com/opinions/2009/11/18/2009-11-18_to_revive_new_yorks_economy_ 
attack_lawsuit_abuse.html. 
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that the legal climate was a factor in business location deci-
sions.113 Such a significant factor should show up in economic 
outcome measurements. 
Some research has already tested the effects of tort law on 
economic variables. Much of this research has involved particu-
lar areas of law (such as medical malpractice), individual doc-
trines (such as joint and several liability) or discrete economic 
measures (such as labor productivity). Unfortunately, there is 
little research on overall economic effects of the tort litigation 
environment. The research that exists is generally not rigorous. 
This Section begins by reviewing the leading empirical studies 
on economic effects of tort law.  
A. STUDIES OF TORT REFORM 
A movement to reform tort law, generally in a pro-
defendant direction, began in the 1980s and continues to this 
day.114 Some have sought to assess the effects of tort law by ex-
amining the before and after effects of tort reform, typically 
with respect to the operation of the legal system. Thus, placing 
caps on noneconomic damages was associated with reduced lit-
igation115 and reduced damage awards.116 A variety of reforms 
had the effect of reducing general liability losses.117 However, 
these studies do not directly measure the overall economic ef-
fects of tort reform. 
Some have analyzed the general economic effects of tort 
reform, including medical malpractice and its effect on the 
 
 113. John N. Frank, Do Legal Costs Really Drive Up the Cost of Doing 
Business in North America? And Is This the Year That All Changes?, FOR-
WARD ONLINE (May/June 2004), http://forward.msci.org/articles/0605tort.cfm 
(discussing HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2005 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE 
LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY 13 (2005)). 
 114. For a summary of tort reform efforts and their consequences, see gen-
erally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE STATES (2004). 
 115. Mark J. Browne & Robert Puelz, The Effect of Legal Rules on the Val-
ue of Economic and Non-Economic Damages and the Decision to File, 18 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 189, 190–91 (1999). 
 116. See Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical 
Study of Medical Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
199, 203 (2001) (finding that average recovery by plaintiffs decreased after 
medical malpractice damage caps were implemented).  
 117. Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legisla-
tion: Assessing Our Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 
supra note 103, at 272, 274; W. Kip Viscusi et al., The Effect of 1980s Tort 
Reform Legislation on General Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 6 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165, 176–80 (1993). 
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medical profession or insurance.118 Other early research consi-
dered the effect of liability reforms on state labor productivi-
ty.119 The authors found a dramatic effect, with states that 
adopted tort reform having significantly greater increases in 
aggregate labor productivity. 
The study‘s simple definition of labor productivity (gross 
state product divided by employment) may be unreliable. Vari-
ous other factors can influence labor productivity, including the 
composition of business for a particular state. The authors con-
sidered effects in different industry sectors, but the results 
were rather mixed—in some cases increased liability was asso-
ciated with significant productivity increases, in others not.120 
The authors controlled for political and interest group fac-
tors,121 but a vast number of possible third factors were not 
controlled for and may well explain the results. The authors 
acknowledged a possible endogeneity bias (that tort reform cor-
related with unobserved determinants of productivity) but had 
no means to test this effect.122 Moreover, while labor productiv-
ity is a very important economic factor, the study did not meas-
ure the externalities from liability reform and largely misses 
the economic benefits (i.e. deterrence) of tort liability. 
Another study sought to measure the benefits of tort law 
through accident reduction, but hypothesized that excessive 
tort law could increase accidents by discouraging innovative 
and beneficial products.123 The authors measured the effects of 
tort reforms such as limits on punitive and noneconomic dam-
ages, provision for prejudgment interest, collateral source 
rules, and joint and several liability on states‘ accidental, non-
 
 118. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham et al., The Impact of Tort Reform on Em-
ployer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums, J.L. ECON & ORG. (forthcoming), 
available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/12/30/jleo.ewq017.full 
.pdf (finding that certain tort reforms reduced insurance premiums slightly, by 
one to two percent). 
 119. Thomas J. Campbell et al., The Link Between Liability Reforms and 
Productivity: Some Empirical Evidence, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, at 107, 108. 
 120. Id. at 126–29.  
 121. Id. at 127. 
 122. Id. at 133. 
 123. Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental 
Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221, 235–36 (2007). This hypothesis is grounded in 
other research showing that there is an optimal level of tort law for innovation 
and that excess tort liability may reduce beneficial product safety innovation. 
Viscusi & Moore, supra note 94. 
 2011] ECONOMICS OF TORT REFORM 49 
 
motor vehicle death rates.124 They found that some tort reforms 
(such as damage caps) had the effect of reducing accident rates, 
though other reforms (reforms related to product liability and 
one type of collateral source reform, admit evidence) were asso-
ciated with increases.125 Overall, states with tort reforms gen-
erally had greater decreases in accident rates than those with-
out such reforms and the authors estimated that the net effect 
of tort reform was to save approximately 24,000 lives.126 While 
this study did not measure economic effects, it struck at the 
very economic purpose of tort law—to deter causing accidents. 
One of the authors, though, subsequently reached different 
conclusions when examining malpractice laws. She found that 
caps on total damages and collateral source reforms were asso-
ciated with an increase in deaths.127 In addition, the migration 
of doctors to reform states may have increased deaths in neigh-
boring states, and the reforms disproportionately harmed wom-
en.128 Much like the general studies on the deterrent effect of 
tort law, the result of research on tort reform effects is ambi-
guous. While the authors sought to control for other determi-
nants of death rates, they could consider only a few, and many 
uncontrolled third variables may have been the true explana-
tion of the results. 
As a general rule, studies of tort reform have significant 
limitations because they do not consider the baseline level of 
tort law that is being reformed. This may produce selection bias 
and endogeneity problems. Suppose that there is some optimal-
ly efficient state of tort law (say at 0.5). States with more pro-
plaintiff tort law systems (say at 0.75) that adopt pro-defendant 
reforms should show economic benefits. However, a state with 
more pro-defendant baseline tort law (say at 0.25) that adopted 
similar pro-defendant reforms would not show these benefits, 
because it would be moving further away from the optimum. 
Thus, a study of reform without considering the baseline tort 
law reformed may produce distorted results.  
Consider how a focus on tort reform legislation might yield 
misleading results in the tort context. It is plausible that more 
pro-plaintiff states, with inefficient baseline law, are more like-
ly to adopt tort reforms. Because these states begin with a 
 
 124. Rubin & Shepard, supra note 123, at 229. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 235. 
 127. See Shepherd, supra note 14, at 970. 
 128. Id. 
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baseline that is excessive, those reforms should tend to show 
positive effects. But the positive effect comes not from the con-
tent of the reforms themselves so much as from the shift in the 
underlying baseline. One could not necessarily expect other 
states, with a baseline tort law that is more pro-defendant, to 
gain positive results from further tort reforms. Similarly, the 
association between tort reform and reduced accidental deaths 
might be an artifact of the states that adopted tort reform being 
those where such action was beneficial. 
This is evident from the study of the effect of tort reform 
measures on labor productivity.129 Reforms that decreased lia-
bility had a very positive, statistically significant, effect on la-
bor productivity in the finance, insurance, and real estate sec-
tor.130 However, the study found that reforms that increased 
liability also had a (slightly less) positive, statistically signifi-
cant effect on labor productivity in this sector.131 While this 
might be attributable to mere random noise, it also might show 
an efficient selection effect—those states were moving their 
baseline law in the direction of optimality.  
This possible selection effect bias is but one example of how 
studies of tort reform may be skewed. Research on costs shows 
that the states most likely to adopt medical malpractice tort 
reform are also those with managed care,132 so that the results 
may not simply be attributable to the tort reform but instead to 
a third factor, or a third factor combined with tort reform. Con-
sequently, the baseline level of tort liability law must be ex-
amined. 
While the studies of tort reform provide us with some in-
formation, the selection effect problems mean that they have 
significant limitations in describing the economic effects of tort 
law. It is the baseline overall status of tort law that must be 
evaluated economically. I move on to undertake such a test, us-
ing the Chamber of Commerce and PRI measures of interstate 
differences in tort law. The following Section presents my anal-
ysis of these scales on various economic measures. 
 
 129. Campbell et al., supra note 119, at 127. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, The Welfare Effects of 
Medical Malpractice Liability 3 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 15,383, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478801. 
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B. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TORT LAW 
As discussed above, some have studied the effect of tort law 
on economic variables, such as innovation.133 Other research on 
individual products found that lessened liability tends to re-
duce product prices.134 There is little rigorous evidence, though, 
on the overall economic effect of different tort liability stan-
dards. 
Some existing research, though not peer reviewed, has 
gone beyond the tort reform context and sought to examine the 
effects of baseline tort standards, using the PRI and Chamber 
of Commerce measures. These studies will be discussed in more 
depth later in this paper. A PRI study found that states with 
better rankings on their measure of tort law had better state 
gross domestic product growth, labor earnings growth and tax 
revenue increases.135 
Another study used the Chamber of Commerce index and 
found that higher rankings on that scale were associated with 
better state per capita economic growth.136 This brief study 
considered only state growth rates from 1995 to 1999.137 The 
research contained no control variables whatsoever to account 
for possible third factors and its results are therefore quite ten-
tative. 
This existing research is relatively crude and conducted by 
conservative or business groups devoted to reducing tort liabili-
ty. A liberal, anti-tort reform group has conducted its own re-
search and found no association between tort costs and factors 
such as innovation and productivity.138 This analysis was like-
wise crude, though, and may also have been infected by the bi-
as of the researchers. 
 
 133. See Viscusi & Moore, supra note 94. 
 134. See, e.g., Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the 
Market for Childhood Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 273 (1994); Richard L. 
Manning, Products Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in Canada and the 
United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 203, 234 (1997). 
 135. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, PAC. RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE, U.S. TORT LIABILITY INDEX: 2006 REPORT 71–77 (2006), available 
at http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/2006_Tort_Index.pdf. 
 136. TODD G. BUCHHOLZ & ROBERT W. HAHN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LE-
GAL REFORM, DOES A STATE‘S LEGAL FRAMEWORK AFFECT ITS ECONOMY? 4–5 
(2002), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php? 
id=1018. 
 137. Id. at 5. 
 138. Chimerine & Eisenbrey, supra note 71, at 10. 
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International evaluations are complicated by substantial 
differences among nations (other than tort litigation). The role 
of government in these countries differs, as do their cultures.139 
Moreover, reliable international data on litigation is quite li-
mited. Consequently, cross-national research offers less prom-
ise for assessing the economic effects of tort litigation. 
The American states offer greater promise as a laboratory 
for a general study of the effects of tort law. While there are 
various cultural and other differences among the states, they 
are surely more similar than different nations and are part of a 
single market, with little restriction on interstate commerce. A 
great deal of data is available on the states for use in an empir-
ical analysis. The most uncertain data is on the state of differ-
ent tort liability systems, and I use both the Chamber and PRI 
measures in this analysis. 
It has been argued that ―[m]uch of what we think we know 
about the behavior of the tort litigation system is untrue, un-
known, or unknowable.‖140 Since this time, though, additional 
information has become available, such as the Chamber and 
PRI studies, which enable us to understand more. While I 
would not purport to have ascertained the final answers, this 
research may illuminate the effects of tort law on economic 
matters of interest. 
III.  THE MEASURES OF TORT LAW USED IN THIS STUDY   
Quantitatively evaluating the effect of tort law on the 
economy requires some measure of the state of tort law. The 
United States provides the states as a laboratory—while our 
states share much tort law in common, they also have distinc-
tive differences. History has seen some dramatic differences in 
state tort law (e.g., comparative vs. contributory negligence, 
strict product liability). Today, the differences in state tort law 
are not so great, but material differences remain, and they 
 
 139. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the 
United States of America: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. & 
SOC‘Y 400, 400 (1991) (suggesting that different litigation practices in these 
nations ―reflect fundamental cultural perspectives‖). 
 140. Saks, supra note 12, at 1149; see also F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature 
and Impact of the ―Tort Reform‖ Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 476–77 
(2006) (suggesting that ―because of the limitations on the available data con-
cerning the operation of the tort system and the effect of reforms, there is no 
way to be sure whether the tort system hinders innovation, competitiveness, or 
access to healthcare, whether it provides an improper level of incentives for 
safety, or whether tort reform will reduce any undesirable effects‖). 
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have been considered significant. To conduct an empirical study 
of such differences requires some quantitative measure, and at 
least two are available and will now be summarized. 
A. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
In 2002, the United States Chamber of Commerce began 
publishing a survey evaluating state tort law systems, which 
has become the best-known rating system for tort law.141 The 
Chamber employed Harris Interactive to conduct telephone in-
terviews of a ―nationally representative sample of in-house 
general counsel, senior litigators and other senior attorneys 
who are knowledgeable about litigation matters at companies 
with annual revenues of at least $100 million.‖142 Of the 957 
respondents, only 6% were from insurance companies.143 The 
survey is not limited to tort litigation but also considers con-
tract law.144 
The survey respondents were asked to give grades ranging 
from ―A‖ to ―F‖ on twelve topics. The issues rated for each state 
were145: 
 Having and enforcing meaningful venue requirements, 
 Overall treatment of tort and contract litigation, 
 Treatment of class action suits and mass consolidation 
suits, 
 Punitive damages, 
 Timeliness of summary judgment or dismissal, 
 Discovery, 
 Scientific and technical evidence, 
 Non-economic damages, 
 Judges‘ impartiality, 
 Judges‘ competence, 
 Juries‘ predictability, and 
 Juries‘ fairness. 
The respondents‘ assessments are then cumulated to provide a 
mean grade for each category and the mean grades are aver-
aged to provide an overall state grade.146 
 
 141. Here, I analyze the 2008 study. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2008 U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY (2008). 
 142. Id. at 6. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 7. 
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The topics are not ideal for a study of tort law. While some 
seem largely focused on tort issues (punitive damages, non-
economic damages), others are much broader (e.g., assessing 
the quality of judges across the board). In addition the ―overall 
treatment‖ category would seem to take account of other cate-
gories, yet they are all added together and given equal weight 
for an overall score.147 
The Chamber of Commerce ratings of tort law have been 
criticized by Theodore Eisenberg.148 He complains that the 
Chamber‘s survey reflects a biased sample, because it reflects 
only the views of those on the business side of litigation.149 He 
also identifies an apparent correlation between ratings and 
state population.150 Another potential bias arises from the fact 
that the survey‘s respondents were provided with the results 
from preceding years.151 Eisenberg proceeds to demonstrate the 
apparent inaccuracy of the ratings on particular legal meas-
ures, such as punitive damages and class action treatment.152 
The high intercorrelation of state assessments on different le-
gal measures suggests to him that some underlying ―latent‖ 
factor explains the relative ratings of the states.153 In response 
to these criticisms, a representative of the survey company ex-
plained that the goal of the research was to measure percep-
tion, not the actual state of the law, and the negative effects of 
tort liability may primarily be the result of perceptions.154 
While the perception defense has some value, it under-
mines the true test of tort law, insofar as the rating may not re-
flect actual change in the laws. Alabama, for example, has seen 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: In-
accurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969 
(2009). 
 149. Id. at 974–75. 
 150. Id. at 995–97. While Eisenberg suggests this is a reflection of the fre-
quency of litigation, id., it is also plausible that larger states may have fea-
tures that produce more pro-plaintiff law. 
 151. Id. at 977.  
 152. Id. at 982–87. 
 153. Id. at 988–92. 
 154. See GARY L. GITTINGS & JOHN W. BAGBY, MANAGING PRODUCT LIABIL-
ITY TO ACHIEVE HIGHWAY INNOVATIONS 4 (Nat‘l Coop. Highway Research Pro-
gram, Synthesis of Highway Practice No. 265, 1998) (suggesting that 
―[p]erception versus reality of product liability [is] a barrier to innovation‖); 
Alan S. Miller & Lawrence R. Holzman, Products Liability and Associated 
Perceptions of Risk, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENVIRON. 347, 353 (1994) (noting 
that ―current perceptions of products-liability risk ‗chills‘ innovation in tech-
nological endeavors‖). 
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a significant change in its tort law regime, without a corre- 
sponding shift in Chamber of Commerce evaluations.155 This 
suggests that actual tort law rules do not drive perceptions as 
measured by the survey, which would undermine any argu-
ment for changing actual rules. However, it is also possible that 
it takes time for perceptions to change. Businesses may wait to 
see how new legal rules influence trial practice before changing 
their impression of a state‘s tort environment. 
The overall impact of Eisenberg‘s criticisms is uncertain. 
There is no reason to think respondents are biased between 
states. Moreover, business perceptions of state law could be the 
more accurate reflection of the effect of tort law in a given 
state.156 Judges are very deferential to jury verdicts, and judges 
themselves may apply the law differently for ideological or oth-
er reasons. Finally, the existence of an underlying factor does 
not undermine the validity of the test—in fact, such a factor is 
precisely what we are talking about when we discuss the effects 
of tort law on the economy. 
One study using the Chamber of Commerce measures pro-
vides some empirical evidence for its accuracy.157 The authors 
used the scale as a variable to predict automobile liability ex-
penses.158 If there were no correlation between the Chamber‘s 
score and reality, there should be no correlation between the 
score and liability expense. Yet the study found a significant 
association between the Chamber‘s score and the two proxies 
used for automobile liability costs: premiums for automobile 
liability insurance per vehicle and automobile liability losses 
and loss adjustment expenses incurred per vehicle.159 The au-
thors found that if the liability environments in all states were 
at the level of the Chamber‘s top scoring state (Delaware), 
there would be a total savings of nearly $23 billion.160  
 
 155. Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 994–95. Indeed, a review of rankings 
over the years since 2002 shows a high level of intertemporal consistency (De-
laware was ranked first every year), though some states show significant vari-
ation. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 141, at 96. 
 156. Daniel Kessler, Fault, Settlement, and Negligence Law, 26 RAND J. 
ECON. 296, 296 (1995). The study concluded that the ―letter of the law may be 
less important in shaping individual‘s behavior than scholars have supposed.‖ 
Id. at 309. 
 157. Robert E. Hoyt & Lawrence S. Powell, The Effect of Liability Envi-
ronment on Tort System Costs: Evidence from Automobile Insurance (Sept. 
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=808404. 
 158. Id. at 21. 
 159. Id. at 14–18. 
 160. Id. at 19. 
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The results of this study give some assurance that the 
Chamber‘s measure captures something about the state‘s tort 
liability system, even if its measures for individual variables 
were considered unreliable. Others have expressed confidence 
in the Chamber‘s ―ability to measure the quality of courts‖ as 
well.161 Perhaps the individual measures are not entirely accu-
rate, but the overall measure may capture some latent feature 
of the state‘s judicial system that is either pro-plaintiff or pro-
defendant. While this finding may limit the value of the scale 
for tort reform purposes, it can still be used for assessing the 
effect of the system on the economy. If the perceptions ap-
peared to have a significant economic effect, independent of the 
content of the law itself, a state would certainly want to explore 
ways to change those perceptions. 
B. PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
A second index of different state tort liability systems was 
prepared by Pacific Research Institute (PRI).162 In contrast to 
the survey approach of the Chamber of Commerce, PRI at-
tempted to measure the actual law of each state on twenty-
eight separate measures, not merely perceptions of the law.163 
These measures include164: 
 Existence of a cap on appeal bonds, 
 Existence of caps on non-economic damages (excluding 
medical-malpractice lawsuits), 
 Existence of caps on punitive damages (excluding medi-
cal-malpractice lawsuits), 
 Caps on damage awards in medical-malpractice lawsuits 
 Nature of class-action rules, 
 Existence of attorney contingency-fee limits (excluding 
medical-malpractice lawsuits), 
 Use of contributory, comparative, or modified-comparative 
standard for plaintiff ‘s negligence, 
 Nature of rules on joint and several liability, 
 Nature of rules on early offers of settlement, 
 
 161. E.g., Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect of Judicial Indepen-
dence on Courts: Evidence from the American States, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 
413 (2006). 
 162. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31. 
 163. Id. at 3. 
 164. Id. at 24. 
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 Existence of an ―Illinois Brick repealer‖ statute for anti-
trust litigation,165 
 Existence of attorney-retention sunshine rules for state 
litigation, 
 Reforms of collateral source rule, 
 Nature of jury service rules, 
 Existence of attorney-fee limits in medical malpractice 
cases, 
 Pre-trial screening or arbitration in medical malpractice 
cases, 
 Asbestos- and silica-liability rules, 
 Construction liability rules, 
 Existence of an FDA or FTC compliance defense, 
 Retailer and manufacturer product liability rules, 
 Exemptions for junk food or obesity claims, 
 Appointment or election of state supreme court justices, 
 Existence of a ―harmful‖ attorney general, 
 Nature of venue rules, 
 Standards for expert witnesses, 
 Conditions for expert witnesses in medical-malpractice 
litigation, 
 Statute of limitations for medical-malpractice litigation, 
 Size of juries and majority requirements, and 
 Existence of a complex litigation court. 
This index is focused more specifically on torts than the 
Chamber of Commerce measure, but does include some meas-
ures related to statutory enforcement or litigation more broad-
ly.166 The list of topics measured is quite extensive but some are 
rather narrow (e.g., availability of junk food lawsuits). The cor-
relation among the different scores is quite low, in contrast to 
the Chamber survey.167 
The choice of some variables in the PRI list is questionable. 
For example, PRI assumes that the existence of a separate 
court for complex litigation is pro-defendant, but this could be 
 
 165. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that only di-
rect purchasers can sue for damages arising from antitrust violations. 431 
U.S. 720, 746 (1977). Most states have passed laws, called ―Illinois Brick re-
pealers,‖ that allow other victims to sue as well. Robert H. Lande, New Op-
tions for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of 
Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447, 447–48 (2010). 
 166. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 24. 
 167. Id. at 40–45. 
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disputed.168 PRI also prefers appointment to the election of 
state supreme court judges, but the effect of this process is by 
no means certain.169 Presumably, these factors are based upon 
the perceptions of which legal variables are significant to busi-
ness and in many cases the PRI variable was grounded in some 
research on the relevance of the particular variable to economic 
consequences.170 
PRI cumulates its legal scores into what it calls an input 
ranking of the overall state of a state‘s tort law.171 The twenty-
eight separate variables were ranked among the states, and an 
average ranking was produced for the input index, giving each 
variable equal weight.172 This is of course questionable, as the 
effect of each variable is not the same. The numeric scores were 
also treated as linear differentials, though this may be inaccu-
rate. In addition, the numeric scaling of each particular varia-
ble was necessarily arbitrary,173 which is compounded by the 
 
 168. There is a theory that a specialized business court, characterized by 
PRI as a complex litigation court, would ―attract top-notch judges, with exper-
tise and sensitivity to business issues‖ or that such a court would ―lead to 
more predictable, consistent and prudent‖ results. Ember Reichgott Junge, 
Business Courts: Efficient Justice or Two-Tiered Elitism?, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 315, 317 (1998). However, this has not been demonstrated by rigorous 
study, and the effect of such courts is ―unproven.‖ Id. at 318. If these courts 
were preferable to companies, one might expect that they would diminish re-
liance on arbitration clauses, but this does not appear to be the case. See 
Christopher Drahozal, Business Courts and the Future of Litigation, 10 CAR-
DOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 492 (2009). 
 169. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Inde-
pendence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 196 (2003) (studying declarations of unconsti-
tutionality and finding some effect of the merit plan selection system but not 
other forms of judicial selection); Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, 
What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make?, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 25, 
39 (1979) (finding little variation in judiciaries by selection method). There are 
various forms of appointment and elections (partisan or nonpartisan) among 
the states. The simple binary division may be misleading. And the conclusions 
favoring appointment can also be questioned. For example, merit plan selec-
tion methods (a form of appointment) have been linked to more appellate liti-
gation. F. Andrew Hanssen, On the Politics of Judicial Selection: Lawyers and 
State Campaigns for the Merit Plan, 110 PUB. CHOICE 79, 80 (2002). Elections, 
conversely, may be used by business groups to turn tort law in a more pro-
defendant direction, as occurred in Texas. See Anthony Champagne, Tort 
Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483, 1483–84 (2005) (dis-
cussing success in reversing pro-plaintiff Texas law). 
 170. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 23. 
 171. Id. at 40–45. 
 172. Id. at 39. 
 173. The rankings were between 1 and 50, but varied depending on the 
number of discernible gradations for the measure. Id. If the researchers could 
divide the states into three categories, they received numeric ratings of 1, 25.5, 
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cumulation of the numeric scores, but the overall figures may 
generally reflect the tort system of a state. 
C. COMPARING THE SCALES 
Both the Chamber of Commerce and PRI studies attempt 
to measure the characteristics of the states‘ laws and the de-
gree to which they favor plaintiffs, and are often taken as evi-
dence of the relative state liability regimes.174 The Chamber 
and PRI scales, based respectively on perception and descrip-
tion of legal content, are also readily comparable. The associa-
tion of states on the Chamber‘s overall measure and the PRI‘s 
input score scales is displayed in Figure 1. The metrics differ in 
that a lower score is better on the PRI scale but worse on the 
Chamber‘s scale. If they correlated as expected, one would see a 
line slanting downward from the upper-left to the lower-right of 
the graph. 
 
Figure 1 
Comparative Tort Liability Scores 
 
 
and 50. If they were divided into five categories, the states would be rated at 1, 
13.25, 25.5, 37.75, and 50. See id. Of course, there was no attempt to deter-
mine if the difference between 1 and 13.25 was equivalent to the difference 
between 37.75 and 50. See id. 
 174. Id. at 1; HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 141, at 6. 
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There is no obvious association between the two metrics. 
The reasonably large number of data points in the upper-right 
quadrant of the graph represents states that the Chamber of 
Commerce considers relatively good on tort law but PRI grades 
as relatively bad. Illinois, for example, ranks forty-sixth on the 
PRI scale (fifth-worst state), but ranks fifth-best on the Cham-
ber of Commerce measure. Large disparities also exist for other 
states. The highest level of agreement is probably for Louisi-
ana, which ties for the worst state on the Chamber measure 
and is the eighth-worst state according to PRI.  
One possible explanation for the lack of association is the 
simple fact that they do not purport to measure the same thing. 
The Chamber measures perceptions,175 while PRI measures le-
gal content.176 Moreover, they do not even measure the same 
legal dimensions. A few broad issues, including general legal 
quality, are measured in the Chamber study,177 while PRI 
measures numerous, often quite specific, legal doctrines.178
 Comparing the ratings for expert evidence between the two 
scales is informative. PRI measures the standard for admissi-
bility of expert witnesses with a scale including use of the more 
rigorous Daubert standard.179 The Chamber measured percep-
tions of the state‘s standards for scientific and technical evi-
dence,180 which is vague but seems similar to the PRI standard. 
Figure 2 presents the state scores on the two measures. A true 
correlation should show a downwards slanting line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 175. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 179. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 36–37. 
 180. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 2 
Comparative Expert Evidence Scores 
 
 
Both scales purport to measure roughly the same thing. A 
regression of the two shows no significant association between 
the measures. Further exploration reveals that the one PRI va-
riable that has the strongest expected statistically significant 
relationship with the Chamber‘s overall measure was the elec-
tion of state supreme court justices, not any of the specific doc-
trinal measures. The lack of correlation for the two measures is 
surely troubling. 
Given the lack of association between the two measures of 
tort law, it may be that measured business perceptions do not 
reflect the substance of the state‘s law. It seems reasonable to 
assume that if tort law is indeed important to business success 
the two would be highly correlated. Perhaps some states have 
done effective public relations work and fooled businesses about 
the nature of their tort system. Or perhaps one (or both) of the 
measures is simply inaccurate (such as suggested by Eisen-
berg‘s evaluation of the Chamber of Commerce study). It is also 
possible that PRI‘s measures of actual legal content missed the 
issues that businesses consider truly important as assessed by 
the Chamber‘s survey of business perceptions. In this research, 
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I will use both measures to examine economic effects of tort 
law.181 
IV.  AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE 
TORT LAW   
This Part presents my empirical assessment of the econom-
ic effects of tort law in the United States, using the Chamber 
and PRI measures. Evaluating the economic effect of tort law is 
difficult. For one thing, which variables most accurately dem-
onstrate the effects of tort law on the economy is far from clear. 
One must also control for third variables that may prove the 
true determinant of state economic measures. 
One additional problem with state law comparisons in-
volves spillover effects. The laws of a given state will affect 
practices in other states. A national enterprise must consider 
the laws of all states in its manufacturing and production deci-
sions. A plaintiff might arise from any state, and the opportuni-
ty for plaintiff forum shopping allows litigation to focus on the 
most pro-plaintiff jurisdiction. While in theory such an enter-
prise may forego participation in a given state, doing so neces-
sarily involves sacrificing a great deal of business. Thus, differ-
ences in state law may not matter so much if, for example, each 
business must adapt to the content of the strictest state law. 
While this spillover effect does not entirely undermine inter-
state comparisons, it mutes their relative effects. State courts 
may even discriminate against out-of-state defendants.182 Prac-
tically speaking, this spillover effect means that any discovered 
differences are probably understatements of the true economic 
effects of tort law. 
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The object of this study is to test the effect of tort law, 
which requires some measure of the state of tort law in a state. 
There is no one conclusive measure, so I will employ several, 
discussed below. I also control for various other factors that 
 
 181. In its 2006 report, PRI suggested that the ―two rankings are best 
viewed as complements.‖ MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 135, at 53.  
 182. See, e.g., Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, Exporting Tort 
Awards, 23 REG., no. 2, 2000 at 21, 23–26 (finding that states tend to impose 
higher liability on out-of-state defendants). At least for elected state judicia-
ries, the ―ability to transfer vast amounts of wealth from out-of-state corpora-
tions may be the crucial factor driving the tort law crisis.‖ Zywicki, supra note 
45, at 15. 
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may be correlated with the dependent variables of interest and 
the tort law variables such as quality of states‘ court systems, 
population, and urbanization. The available data is for one year 
(2008), so a standard OLS cross-sectional regression method is 
used in the study. The regression takes the form: 
 
Y = B + BiI + BnN + u 
 
Where Y is the dependent variable of interest, B is the con-
stant, I is the measure of tort law (Chamber or PRI), N rep-
resents all the additional control variables used in the equa-
tion, and u is a random disturbance term. 
1. Tort Variables 
The Chamber of Commerce‘s overall measure and the PRI 
input measure are designed to capture the full scope of a state‘s 
tort law and the degree to which it may be pro-plaintiff. They 
are obvious independent variables for use in this research. 
However, as discussed above, both scales are imperfect for this 
test. The Chamber measure is a test only of perceptions and 
has been questioned for its reliability.183 The PRI measure is of 
the actual legal rules of the state but it cannot address all the 
tort rules of the state. Some of the rules comprising the meas-
ure may not be the important ones, while other important rules 
may have been omitted. PRI did not select the measured rules 
randomly, though, and the chosen rules were those considered 
to be salient by ―legal experts, university professors, and law-
yers.‖184 
While neither the Chamber nor the PRI measures are per-
fect scales for the effects of tort law, they are the best available 
and provide reasonable measures. The Chamber‘s measure of 
business perceptions should reflect how business assesses tort 
law, which influences business decision making. The PRI‘s 
measure of actual tort doctrines is an even more direct measure 
of the composition of a state‘s tort regime. 
 
 183. See Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 1001–02. 
 184. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 2. Accompanied by an 
―exhaustive search of the academic-journal literature,‖ as well as state tort-
reform actions, PRI recognized that the variables were not exhaustive and 
suggested variables for some where it could not obtain data. Id. at 11. 
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2. Control Variables 
There are also separate factors, other than tort liability, 
that must be considered as control variables. Many factors in-
fluence state economic welfare and it is a daunting task to iso-
late those. If these additional variables tend to correlate with 
the tort variables of interest in this study, they may create a 
spurious association. In this Section I identify several general 
control variables that might plausibly skew associations be-
tween tort liability and general economic measures.  
One variable is the quality of the court system itself. Ber-
kowitz and Clay have found that the states settled by civil law 
nations had lower quality courts and less independent judicia-
ries.185 To control for this possible effect, I create a binary vari-
able for whether the state was civil law or common law in  
origin. 
Another relevant external control variable is urbanization, 
the percent of a state‘s population that lives in cities. Such 
proximate living is likely to produce more torts and more tort 
litigation.186 The greater litigation may have an effect on the 
content of tort law. One study found that urbanization was 
strongly correlated with ―earlier adoptions of the tort innova-
tions‖ studied, due to more opportunities to shape the law.187 
Those in urban areas may be ―particularly affected by the high 
costs of the tort system.‖188 In addition, one would expect urba-
nization to be associated with our economic dependent va-
riables, so it is used as a control variable. 
 
 185. Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Impli-
cations for State Constitutions, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 62, 65, 68 tbl.1 (2005); 
Berkowitz & Clay, supra note 161, 416–31 (2006). 
 186. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Explaining the Variance in the Number of 
Tort Suits Across U.S. States and Between the United States and England, 26 
J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 480 (1997) (noting that suits are ―more likely in an urban 
setting‖ because the ―parties to accidents are more likely to be strangers‖ and 
because ―lawyers are disproportionately concentrated in urban areas‖); Han-
Duck Lee et al., How Does Joint and Several Tort Reform Affect the Rate of 
Tort Filings? Evidence from the State Courts, 61 J. RISK & INS. 295, 303 (1994) 
(providing additional reasons why urbanization would be ―positively correlated 
with the rate of tort filings‖). There is a clear positive association of urbaniza-
tion and the frequency of medical malpractice claims. Patricia Danzon, The 
Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L. & ECON. 115, 
143 (1984). 
 187. James M. Lutz, Regional Leaders in the Diffusion of Tort Innovations 
Among the American States, 27 PUBLIUS 39, 42 (1997). 
 188. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 104TH CONG., IMPROVING THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL SYSTEM: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TORT REFORM 1 (Comm. 
Print 1996), reprinted at http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/tort/tort.htm. 
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Another control variable to consider is the role of other 
branches of state government. As noted above, tort law may 
have a smaller role in Europe simply because its function is as-
sumed by legislative or executive branches. Consequently, what 
appears to be a more pro-defendant approach to tort law may 
be the result of a larger legislative or executive role in protect-
ing accident victims. In the United States, however, pro-
defendant tort law appears to correlate with other governmen-
tal economic freedom protections.189 If so, this association could 
distort analysis—the apparent economic effects of tort law 
might truly be those of other economic freedoms. To test this 
effect, I use a measure of government size for each state.190 
The state‘s ideology may also be relevant to the results. 
One might expect that more liberal ideological states would 
have a more pro-plaintiff set of tort law rules and they may 
well have juries who are more sympathetic to plaintiffs. Yet 
such states would also be expected to have more anti-business 
regulatory policies as well. Suppose the research found that 
more pro-plaintiff tort law was associated with less economic 
growth. If pro-plaintiff states also had more business regula-
tion, that effect might actually be due to the greater regulation, 
not the tort laws. Hence, a control for ideology is necessary. I 
use the percent of popular vote in each state won by President 
Obama in the most recent presidential election.191 
Yet another important variable is the state‘s level of hu-
man capital. More educated populations are conducive to eco-
nomic growth. This measure has been widely used in interna-
tional research, where educational investments have been a 
major determinant of future economic growth.192 One study 
found that the growth in years of schooling in the United States 
explained about 25% of the nation‘s growth of per capita income 
for much of the twentieth century.193 The ―evidence is ‗now 
quite strong of a close link between investments in human capi-
 
 189. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 135, at 56. 
 190. The data for this measure comes from AMELA KARABEGOVIĆ & FRED 
MCMAHON, THE FRASER INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF NORTH AMERICA: 
2008 ANNUAL REPORT (US EDITION) 64 tbl.3.5, 66 tbl.3.6 (2008). 
 191. Election Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, http://elections.nytimes 
.com/2008/results/president/votes.html. 
 192. Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 
Q.J. ECON. 407, 412 (1991). 
 193. EDWARD F. DENISON, TRENDS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
1929–1982, at 15–16 (1985). 
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tal and growth.‘‖194 Research has confirmed this effect on a 
state-by-state basis.195 There are various ways to assess rela-
tive human capital, but for this study, I use a measure of the 
percentage of a state‘s population that has attained a Bache-
lor‘s or more advanced degree.196 
Another control variable involves a state‘s relative econom-
ic reliance on manufacturing. Industrial composition may in-
fluence growth rates, and different states are more or less de-
pendent on manufacturing, as opposed to services.197 Similarly, 
undue reliance on any sector may affect growth rates as econ-
omies change.198  
A final variable of concern is the state‘s social capital, a so-
ciological concept that involves the interconnectedness of indi-
vidual‘s in a society.199 The concept obtained some notoriety 
with the publication of Richard Putnam‘s Bowling Alone, which 
stressed the significance of social capital for a successful society 
and lamented its decline in this nation.200 There is also a 
―widespread consensus‖ that social capital can ―promote eco-
nomic progress.‖201 The consensus is backed by international 
 
 194. Gary S. Becker et al., Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic 
Growth, 98 J. POL. ECON. S12, S13 (1990). 
 195. See Gerald A. Carlino & Richard Voith, Accounting for Differences in 
Aggregate State Productivity, 22 REGIONAL. SCI. & URB. ECON. 597, 616 (1992) 
(finding a significant role for human capital on state productivity differen-
tials); Gasper A. Garofalo & Steven Yamarik, Regional Convergence: Evidence 
from a New State-by-State Capital Stock Series, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 316, 
316 (2002) (finding a significant role for human capital on state growth).  
 196. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
2011, at 151 tbl.229 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ 
2011/tables/11s0229.pdf.  
 197. For an example of the significance of this variable, see W. Robert 
Reed, The Determinants of U.S. State Economic Growth: A Less Extreme 
Bounds Analysis, 47 ECON. INQUIRY 685 (2009). 
 198. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 
1150 (1992) (reporting value of diversification). 
 199. For a summary of the concept, see Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its 
Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3–6 
(1998). The concept is somewhat vague, but has been called ―the social glue 
that produces cohesion‖ and ―also a set of cognitive aptitudes and predisposi-
tions.‖ Joseph E. Stiglitz, Formal and Informal Institutions, in SOCIAL CAPI-
TAL: A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 59, 60 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Sera-
geldin eds., 2000). 
 200. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE passim (2000). 
 201. Kenneth J. Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: 
A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE, supra note 199, at 3; see also PUTNAM, supra 
note 200, at 319–20 (providing evidence of the relationship). 
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empirical research.202 Each of the following regressions will 
employ these control variables. While many other variables 
could affect state economic growth, the number of cases to be 
studied is necessarily limited to fifty, so parsimony in indepen-
dent variables is required. 
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The next question involves the economic measures that 
should be used to test the effects of tort law. While the ultimate 
concern is overall economic welfare, such a broad measure is 
more subject to confounding outside variables, so I also analyze 
other categories. Ideally, the overall economic results should be 
bolstered by more specific economic measures, which would 
suggest the pathway through which the overall results occur. 
I begin by examining the costs of several types of insurance 
against tort liability, which should identify the true costs of a 
tort system. I then consider the associations of tort law on 
overall economic success of the states and on particular eco-
nomic variables (such as productivity and foreign direct in-
vestment). Finally, I evaluate effects on measures of entrepre-
neurship, where interstate tort differences should reveal their 
most profound effects. 
1. Insurance Costs 
Tort liability supposedly hurts the economy through un-
warranted liability awards, forcing people and companies to 
bear undue costs, which cannot be put to more efficient ends, 
and perhaps to forego introducing valuable new products. 
Hence, if the expected harm is occurring, this should appear in 
the form of higher liability costs. There is no comprehensive 
measure of cumulative liability awards in a state and, even if 
there were, much of the cost would be found in private settle-
ments.203 While there is no good measure for actual liability, a 
good proxy could be found in insurance costs. Studies have 
 
 202. See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an 
Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251, 1251 
(1997); Stephen Knack, Social Capital, Growth, and Poverty: A Survey of 
Cross-Country Evidence, in THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT: 
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 42, 44–45 (Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van 
Bastelaer eds., 2002); Paul F. Whitely, Economic Growth and Social Capital, 
48 POL. STUD. 443, 460 (2000). 
 203. See Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 1 (observing that ―most cases are 
settled, and the settlements, which are much more difficult to monitor and ag-
gregate than verdicts, are far more numerous and consequential overall‖). 
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found that certain tort reform measures decrease insurers‘ lia-
bility losses.204 
The PRI report assessing the state of tort law also contains 
ecological data on insurance rates. The data comes from A.M. 
Best Company and purports to be ―the gold standard because 
they are subject to audit and are reviewed by state insurance 
regulatory agencies.‖205 Data is available on nine lines of insur-
ance, plus categories of self-insurance. Losses were divided by 
gross state product to permit comparisons per capita. Because 
the measure is insurance losses, it includes payments in set-
tlements as well as court awards. 
Comparing insurance costs is not a perfect test for liability 
effects. In addition to the control variables discussed above, 
many other variables influence insurance costs. Each state has 
its own system of insurance regulation (and its own set of judi-
cial decisions, typically contract law based) on the obligations of 
insurers. As a result, policy language may differ by state and 
this could have an effect on losses, separate from the tort liabil-
ity system. There are also other measures for the insurance 
costs in states, including premium rates. These other measures, 
however, are more likely to be distorted by different state regu-
latory systems (which in some cases set premiums). Moreover, 
they may be affected by unrelated factors that influence insur-
ance company profits.206  
Liability losses, though imperfect, may be the best availa-
ble measure for tort costs. To the extent that the loss data is 
skewed, this fact is likely to obscure a statistically significant 
relationship and produce a false negative.207 Consequently, a 
statistically significant finding would be strong evidence. How-
ever, as with any statistical study, failing to reject a null hypo-
thesis of no effect is not actually strong evidence of no causal 
effect. 
 
 204. E.g., Patricia Born & W. Kip Viscusi, Insurance Market Responses to the 
1980s Liability Reforms: An Analysis of Firm-Level Data, 61 J. RISK & INS. 192, 
193 (1994); Robert E. Hoyt et al., The Relation Between Tort Law Environment 
and Automobile Insurance Costs, 2007 AMERICAN RISK AND INSURANCE ASSOCI-
ATION ANNUAL MEETING (July 31, 2007), http://www.aria.org/meetings/2007% 
20presentations/HOYT%20POWELL%20STITH%208-03-2007.pdf. 
 205. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 13. 
 206. See, e.g., Chimerine & Eisenbrey, supra note 71, at 2 (contending that 
insurance premiums are affected by other variables such as investment suc-
cess in the market, interest rates, and rising costs, such as for medical care). 
 207. See Frank B. Cross, Perhaps We Should Pay Federal Circuit Judges 
More, 88 B.U. L. REV. 815, 821–22 (2008) (discussing this effect). 
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PRI categorizes data on insurance costs by different seg-
ments, including automobile, farm owners, commercial general 
liability (CGL), other, homeowners, medical malpractice, prod-
uct liability, personal and commercial self-insurance, as well as 
an overall insurance cost score. For this research, I will use as 
dependent variables the overall measure, the CGL insurance 
measure (a form of coverage that broadly includes torts of many 
types), and the product liability insurance costs. The effect of 
tort law on business should be especially apparent in the latter 
two categories. 
I use a two-tailed test that accounts for the possibility that 
stricter tort law rules would be economically beneficial. Re-
member that a lower score is better on the PRI scale but worse 
on the Chamber‘s scale. This means that, if tort law produces 
higher insurance costs, one would expect a negative sign for the 
Chamber measure but a positive sign for the PRI measure. The 
following three tables set out the results for my three depen-
dent variable measures of insurance costs, beginning with the 
overall measure. 
The above models are based on a linear relationship be-
tween the independent and the dependent variables. This is a 
plausible assumption for this model, more liability associated 
with more pro-plaintiff legal doctrine should produce higher in-
surance costs, even if those costs are economically efficient 
ones, which produce societal gain by deterring greater harm. 
Table 1 displays the results for both the overall scale of the 
Chamber and the cumulative input measure of the PRI scale. 
The n for all the tables is 50, the number of states. The Cham-
ber measure is higher for more pro-plaintiff law; the PRI num-
ber is lower for more pro-plaintiff law. If results are as hy-
pothesized, the Chamber measure should have a negative sign, 
and the PRI‘s a positive sign. Theory would also suggest that 
greater urbanization, government size, and liberal ideology 
should be associated with higher insurance costs.208 The table 
displays coefficients, with t-terms in parentheses and statisti-
cally significant associations in bold. 
 
 
 
 208. I expect urbanization to produce more torts, causing more insurance 
liability. Greater government size also would be expected to increase insur-
ance liability (though this might be counteracted by reduced tort liability). I 
presume that more liberal states are more likely to impose costs on business 
and thus show higher insurance costs. 
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Table 1 
Effect of Tort Law on Overall Insurance Costs 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce -9.107053  
PRI  -0.2972 
Civil Law -1.04996 -1.5971 
Human Capital 0.04239 -0.2949 
Social Capital 1.7056 0.6354 
Urbanization 0.1633 0.1852 
Government Size 0.2914 -2.1926 
Ideology 0.0424 0.1049 
Manufacturing -0.3041 -0.3287 
Constant 44.0811 36.7595 
R-Squared 0.3887 0.0656 
 
The results suggest that the Chamber of Commerce meas-
ure may correctly capture the state of tort law as it has a highly 
statistically significant association with overall insurance costs. 
The PRI results do not approach statistical significance, which 
is somewhat surprising because the insurance cost measure 
was PRI‘s own. The control variables are insignificant in all 
tests. Only the Chamber of Commerce measure appeared to be 
driving overall insurance costs. This finding must be viewed 
with some caution, though, because the Chamber provides a 
perceptual measure. Rather than the state of tort law driving 
insurance costs, it may be that the relative state insurance 
costs drove the perceptions of those the Chamber surveyed. 
The overall insurance costs are a broad measure, and a test 
of the effect on CGL insurance costs, which are more closely 
tied to tort law, may be a better test. The following table re-
ports the same regressions for this dependent variable. 
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Table 2 
Effect of Tort Law on CGL Insurance Costs 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce -17.5343  
PRI  -0.0108 
Civil Law -10.0102 -10.1679 
Social Capital 8.3836 5.2987 
Human Capital -0.8847 -1.1171 
Urbanization 0.3778 0.3952 
Government Size -3.1814 -5.7948 
Ideology -0.0348 0.0279 
Manufacturing -0.4007 -0.4675 
Constant 105.4663 66.8828 
R-Squared 0.2257 0.1424 
 
None of our measures were statistically significant, though 
the Chamber of Commerce measure neared significance in its 
expected association with higher insurance costs (p = 0.088). 
The results provide only mild confirmation of the Chamber‘s 
measure of tort liability law for this insurance cost. I conclude 
this Section with the same analysis, but for product liability in-
surance costs, which also might be associated with state liabili-
ty standards. 
 
Table 3 
Effect of Tort Law on Product Liability Insurance Costs 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce 6.3961  
PRI  0.5417 
Civil Law 4.8687 5.7629 
Social Capital 5.6963 6.2336 
Human Capital -0.7771 -0.6242 
Urbanization 0.3729 0.3702 
Government Size -0.3114 1.6391 
Ideology -0.1121 -0.2541 
Manufacturing -0.9136 -0.8619 
Constant 15.3693 8.8852 
R-Squared 0.2292 0.2311 
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There is no association with either of our tort law variables 
(or any other variable) and the direction of the correlation with 
the Chamber score is the opposite of that theorized. The only 
variable that approximates statistical significance is reliance 
on manufacturing, and it is negative (perhaps reflecting state 
protection of local industries). The lack of associations for prod-
uct liability insurance may seem surprising, given the promi-
nence with which product liability claims are commonly asso-
ciated with criticisms of tort law. Product liability cases, 
though, are but a tiny fraction of overall tort litigation. A 
measure of overall tort law may not be a sound proxy for prod-
uct liability law.  
In general, it appears that more pro-defendant tort law as 
measured by the Chamber metric may be associated with lower 
costs for at least some forms of insurance, but this is not true 
for the PRI measure. Even the Chamber measure is not signifi-
cantly associated with the types of insurance costs typically as-
sociated with tort litigation. 
While these insurance costs are not our true dependent va-
riable of concern, they are an important intervening variable. 
The alleged economic harm due to tort law is typically an as-
sessment of its costs to business, which would show up in the 
insurance payment variable. If a measure of tort law is not as-
sociated with higher insurance costs, one would be skeptical 
that it is the true cause of any negative economic effects that 
might be identified. This is not necessarily the case, though. 
Suppose fear of liability suppresses business innovation and 
creation, which hurts the economy. The absence of innovation, 
in this hypothesis, could reduce the insurance costs associated 
with pro-plaintiff tort law but would still harm the economy. 
However, higher insurance costs are not necessarily an 
economic negative. As discussed above, holding responsible 
parties liable can be an economically efficient policy, by compel-
ling them to internalize the external costs they impose on oth-
ers. While higher insurance expenditures would raise the cost 
of business, they would encourage better business practices, 
which cause less harm to others. It is conceivable that the 
greater deterrence could have the effect of reducing insurance 
costs, but this presumably would be more than offset by the 
lesser liability imposed in a more pro-defendant regime.209 
 
 209. Thus, if one imagines a very pro-defendant regime there could be an 
enormity of externalized harms, but very little in insurance-liability costs, be-
cause defendants would rarely be called upon to assume those costs. 
 2011] ECONOMICS OF TORT REFORM 73 
 
A final caveat to the insurance cost measure involves the 
different composition of business among the states, which may 
have some randomness in its operation. Manufacturing is a 
control for this, but an imperfect one. Suppose that mining for 
coal is inherently risky and accompanied by higher insurance 
costs. Some states have coal deposits, while others do not. Of 
those states with coal deposits, such mining will surely be a 
greater or lesser proportion of their economies. This could skew 
the association.210 
Perhaps the greatest relevance of these findings goes to the 
validity of the Chamber and PRI measures. The PRI measure 
does not have the expected correlation. The Chamber measure 
does especially well, with very strong associations with overall 
and CGL liability costs, although not necessarily to the econo-
my as a whole. The remainder of the Section evaluates the ef-
fect of the different systems on economic variables of concern. 
2. Overall Economy 
Although our central concern is the state of tort law on the 
overall economy, broad economic measures may provide the 
weakest test of the hypothesis of the effects of tort law. Count-
less factors affect the quality of a state‘s economy, and they 
cannot all be controlled. Even if tort law were having an effect 
on the magnitude of a state‘s economy, it may be impossible to 
isolate this effect in an empirical study, given all the external 
confounding factors. The failure to find a tort law effect would 
only mean that torts are not the predominant factor in affecting 
state economies, not that tort law has no effect. 
This difficulty in finding a true association may be evi-
denced by international research on economies. A great deal of 
economic research has been devoted to identifying the factors 
associated with growth among nations, such as free trade, 
sound government institutions, and many other factors. While 
studies have found associations between such independent va-
riables and economic growth, the results are not consistently 
statistically significant across studies using different methodol-
ogies or different sets of data.211 The difficulty in finding robust 
 
 210. Ideally, one would control for this effect, but given the limited n of the 
study (fifty states), it is impossible to introduce all the independent variables 
necessary to address the industry composition effect. 
 211. See Antonio Ciccone & Marek Jarocinski, Determinants of Economic 
Growth: Will Data Tell? 1 (European Cent. Bank, ECB Working Paper No. 
852, 2009), available at http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/1052.pdf 
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associations does not mean that factors such as government in-
stitutions or free trade do not influence economic growth (the 
null hypothesis), but simply means that various other random 
factors obscure the association. This problem should be smaller 
for studies of American states, which have many fewer differ-
ences than found among different countries, but the difficulty 
remains.212 The easy and common migration among states also 
means that historic differences should not seriously bias the re-
search. However, the many factors that may influence economic 
conditions among the states may make it difficult to find an ef-
fect from tort law. To combat this, I employ numerous economic 
measures in my search for such an effect. 
One would not necessarily expect the relationship of tort 
law and the economy to follow a linear relationship. Assume 
that there is some optimal tort regime, for economic efficiency 
purposes. If the optimal tort regime were more extreme than 
that of any state regime (whether pro-plaintiff or pro-
defendant), the relationship between tort reform and economic 
performance should be linear. However, if the optimal state of 
the law fell somewhere within the varying state laws, one 
would expect the relationship to be quadratic; states with laws 
more pro-defendant than the optimal law would suffer econom-
ically, as would states with more pro-plaintiff laws. This pros-
pect will be addressed below. 
The first variable of interest is per capita state GDP. This 
measures the association between state tort liability and state 
economic wellbeing. Use of this test contains one major flaw. 
The tort variables are available only for 2008, while the state‘s 
economy is the result of years of history. One might expect that 
the current court liability regimes may resemble the state‘s his-
 
 (concluding that results are ―very sensitive to minor errors in measurement 
and turn out to differ substantially depending on the income estimates being 
used‖). An earlier published study found isolated robust effects on economic 
growth for the share of investment in GDP and international trade, though 
not for other variables. Ross Levine & David Renelt, A Sensitivity Analysis of 
Cross-Country Growth Regressions, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 942, 959 (1992). Re-
searchers have ―found it easy enough to arrive at significant results‖ simply 
because there are so many variables that can be manipulated in this research. 
Jessica Cohen & William Easterly, Introduction: Thinking Big Versus Think-
ing Small, in WHAT WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT? THINKING BIG AND THINKING 
SMALL 1, 3 (Jessica Cohen & William Easterly eds., 2009). 
 212. See W. Mark Crain & Katherine J. Lee, Economic Growth Regressions 
for the American States: A Sensitivity Analysis, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 242, 242 
(1999) (observing that ―while states differ in relevant dimensions, they are not 
so different as to make omitted variables an overwhelming source of error‖). 
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toric practice, but this need not be the case. The results should 
therefore be interpreted with this caveat in mind.  
Table 4 presents the results of our model for per capita 
state GDP, using the same regression equation as in the earlier 
analyses. If pro-plaintiff tort law were harming per capita GDP, 
we would see a negative association with the PRI score and a 
positive association with the Chamber score. 
 
Table 4 
Effect of Tort Law on Per Capita GDP 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce 1020.034  
PRI  230.1302 
Civil Law -19.0764 347.2162 
Social Capital -2720.231 -0.2792 
Human Capital 309.4836 352.2161 
Urbanization -105.7771 -105.2556 
Government Size 4520.696 5099.3110 
Ideology 252.7209 198.200 
Manufacturing -46.2566 -30.7728 
Constant -16.405.62 -22,937.87 
R-Squared 0.8218 0.8333 
 
Both measures of tort liability showed no statistical signi-
ficance, and the PRI measure indicated that more pro-plaintiff 
law is associated with higher state per capita GDP. Not much 
can be concluded from this, though, because of the prospect of 
reverse causality. The strongest associations were with larger 
government and more Obama support with higher state GDP. 
Yet it seems more likely that richer states were more likely to 
vote for President Obama than that voting for President Ob-
ama in 2008 caused the state to be richer in 2008.213 The same 
is true for government size. The government size correlation 
may be that larger government is a superior good; one that 
makes up a larger portion of consumption as income rises. As 
people grow richer, they may be willing to pay more in taxes for 
more government. This also might be true for the PRI measure. 
 
 213. In fact, there was a positive correlation among whites between house-
hold income and the share of Obama votes. See Razib, The White Vote for Ob-
ama, by County & Correlates, GENE EXPRESSION (Nov. 28, 2009, 3:01 PM), 
http://www.gnxp.com/blog/2009/11/white-vote-for-obama-by-county.php. 
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As states grow richer, they may accept more pro-plaintiff tort 
law. Yet the direction of the measure for the Chamber score 
was opposite (richer states had relatively more pro-defendant 
tort law). The social capital estimates are surprising but may 
simply suggest that poorer states are more likely to have this 
measure, rather than that social capital hurts the economy. 
The effect of tort law might be more likely to appear in per 
capita GDP growth rates. The test of tort law on state per capi-
ta growth rates requires an additional independent control va-
riable of the pre-existing state per capita GDP. Economists 
have demonstrated a process called convergence, under which 
poorer jurisdictions will grow faster than richer ones, as they 
can take advantage of technological advances developed by 
richer states and will often have lower costs for items such as 
labor. This is often called the Solow growth model and has been 
subjected to extensive review.214 The model has been applied to 
individual states in the United States and is applicable.215 In-
deed, because of the high level of free trade among American 
states, convergence should be stronger domestically than inter-
nationally. Hence, prior state GDP is an essential control vari-
able. 
The next analysis considers the rate of per capita state 
GDP growth for the prior ten years (1998–2008). Ideally, one 
would test state tort law systems against future economic 
growth, but the data is not available for this; the tort system 
measures are only very recent. Considering the prior ten years 
should be valid if the tort law system did not change substan-
tially during this time. While states are constantly adjusting 
their law, dramatic changes are probably not common. For the 
study, I employ the same model as above, with an added varia-
ble for per capita state GDP at the beginning of the period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 214. For one example, see Walter Nonneman & Patrick Vanhoudt, A Fur-
ther Augmentation of the Solow Model and the Empirics of Economic Growth 
for OECD Countries, 111 Q.J. ECON. 943 (1996). 
 215. See Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Convergence Across 
States and Regions, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 1, 107, 
107–08 (1991); Paul Evans & Georgios Karras, Do Economies Converge? Evi-
dence from a Panel of U.S. States, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 384, 387 (1996). 
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Table 5 
Effect of Tort Law on Per Capita Income Growth 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce -0.0001  
PRI  0.72860 
Civil Law 0.5680 1.6769 
Social Capital 0.4307 1.4964 
Human Capital 0.3206 0.4416 
State GDP -0.0001 -0.0039 
Urbanization -0.0112 -0.0309 
Government Size -0.2956 1.8426 
Ideology 0.0042 -0.0838 
Manufacturing -0.4018 -0.3864 
Constant 26.0584 -11.5629 
R-Squared 0.4 444 0.5519 
 
There is a very strong association between more pro-
defendant law on the PRI scale and lower per capita growth 
(higher PRI scores are pro-plaintiff). The PRI results provide 
evidence that tort law regimes influence the economy, but in 
the opposite direction suggested by tort reformers. This might 
suggest that more plaintiff-friendly tort law helps the economy. 
While counterintuitive, it is somewhat plausible, given the eco-
nomic benefits associated with tort law, as discussed above. 
The following figure illustrates the association of the two 
variables, with confidence intervals on a linear fitted model. 
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Figure 3 
Relationship Between Tort Law and Economic Growth 
 
 
The effect of tort law, as measured by PRI, is quite dramat-
ic. The expected growth rate for the decade for a state with the 
most pro-defendant law was only 5%, while the most pro-
plaintiff regime was associated with an expected growth rate of 
nearly 20%. 
This strong and sizable association appears to be powerful 
evidence for the positive effect of tort law, but it must be 
viewed with caution. Such associations may be epiphenomenal 
and due to some third factor not considered in the regression 
analysis. Although I employed the most prominent control va-
riables, some other factor may have driven the results for this 
particular time period. The remainder of the analyses will 
search for the pathways of the effect of tort law, such as prod-
uctivity, investment, and entrepreneurship. 
V.  PATHWAYS FOR TORT LAW TO AFFECT THE 
GENERAL ECONOMY   
A. PRODUCTIVITY 
One possible measure that could identify a tort liability re-
gime effect is productivity. Productivity is essentially a test of 
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the efficiency of business operations.216 Thus, a Federal Reserve 
Bank analysis noted that when ―gauging the health of the re-
gional economy, arguably the two most important series to 
track are employment and output,‖ and ―combined they form a 
measure of productivity that in the long run ultimately drives 
living standards.‖217 Productivity is a commonly used proxy for 
measuring the effects of government regulations on the econo-
my.218 Lower productivity means an inability to compete in the 
market.219 Thus, this represents a good measure of a state‘s 
economic health. 
Tort liability could hamper productivity in various ways. 
The payouts required in such cases could reduce investment 
that would benefit productivity. Liability might reduce ―the 
rate of both new innovations and the implementation of exist-
ing innovations,‖ which could hamper productivity growth.220 
Some research has shown that tort reform improved state 
productivity.221 In asbestos litigation, for example, statutorily 
avoiding the ―vagaries of the tort system would enable capital 
markets to accurately assess the costs to individual businesses 
and insurers, which could reduce the cost of capital for these 
business and insurers, leading to increased productivity and 
investment.‖222 It thus seems unlikely that stricter tort liability 
would increase productivity. There is some evidence, however, 
that tort law may increase innovation.223 Businesses are also 
plaintiffs, as well as defendants, so pro-plaintiff tort law might 
benefit them. 
 
 216. See PAUL W. BAUER & YOONSOO LEE, ESTIMATING GSP AND LABOR 
PRODUCTIVITY BY STATE 3 (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Pa-
per No. 16, 2006), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/policydis/ 
pdpno16.pdf. 
 217. Id.; see also Andrew B. Bernard & Charles I. Jones, Comparing Apples 
to Oranges: Productivity Convergence and Measurement Across Industries and 
Countries, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1216, 1216 (1996) (suggesting that 
―[c]omparisons of productivity performance across countries are central to 
many of the questions concerning long-run economic growth‖). 
 218. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the 
Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 150–53 (1995). 
 219. See id. at 133. 
 220. Campbell et al., supra note 119. 
 221. See id. at 109. 
 222. Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The 
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 
996 (2005). 
 223. See Barton, supra note 93, at 301. 
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The EPI study found no effect over time in the United 
States between tort costs and productivity growth, but it in-
cluded no control variables, and many other factors could affect 
productivity.224 In addition, the productivity growth in this 
country could have been a result of companies shifting opera-
tions to more pro-defendant jurisdictions. 
My next analysis compares relative state manufacturing 
productivity with their tort liability regimes, as measured by 
the Chamber and PRI. Productivity is measured as manufac-
turing value added per production hour worked, adjusted by 
industrial sector.225 
 
Table 6 
Effect of Tort Law on Manufacturing Productivity 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce 8.5669  
PRI  0.7418  
Civil Law 0.4547 1.677  
Social Capital -1.5379 00.8363 
Human Capital -0.5651 -0.35822 
Urbanization 0.3470 0.3412 
Government Size -0.8076 1.8349 
Ideology 0.4753 0.2815 
Manufacturing 0.3831 0.4531 
Constant 33.5530 24.2429 
R-Squared 0.5977 0.6051 
 
Urbanization is apparently the primary determinant of 
manufacturing productivity, though higher Chamber scores 
were associated with higher productivity.  
While the PRI score was not statistically significant, it 
neared this level (p, 0.10). This provided evidence that pro-
plaintiff tort law was associated with higher manufacturing 
productivity with a significant coefficient, given the scale of this 
measure. Although not statistically significant, the effect of the 
Chamber measure was material (one unit higher Chamber 
 
 224. Ross Eisenbrey, Tort Costs and the Economy: Myths, Exaggerations, 
and Propaganda, ECON. POL‘Y INST. (Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.epi.org/ 
publication/bp174. 
 225. Data for this variable are taken from ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT 
ANDES, THE 2008 STATE NEW ECONOMY INDEX (2008), available at http://www.itif 
.org/files/2008_State_New_Economy_Index.pdf. 
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score represented about a five percent increase in manufactur-
ing productivity).  
B. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The next analysis involves foreign direct investment in the 
states. Various studies have suggested the value of foreign di-
rect investment to international economic growth.226 More in-
vestment is economically valuable, and foreign investment is 
an outside inflow of money that does not require additional 
domestic savings (and hence reduced consumption). Economic 
evidence testifies to the importance of foreign investment for 
the growth of American states as well.227 One study found that 
foreign capital accounted for 3.7% of state output growth be-
tween 1995 and 1999 and over 16.7% of state manufacturing 
output growth.228 
A greater risk of tort liability could deter foreign invest-
ment. The United States Department of Commerce has sug-
gested that international investors are concerned with the 
―comparatively high legal cost of doing business in the U.S. 
market‖ and the ―unpredictable and unfamiliar nature of liabil-
ity in the United States.‖229 Surveys similarly suggest that in-
vestors heavily weigh the litigation environment in deciding 
where to locate.230 However, it is not necessarily the case that 
more pro-defendant tort law is more predictable or desirable. 
Perhaps foreign investors find pro-plaintiff law more predicta-
ble, and it may have attendant economic benefits. 
The next regression focuses on the relative amount of for-
eign direct investment in the states.231 The theory is that for-
eign investors are more likely to do business in a state with a 
more favorable tort climate. Indeed, even if tort law were eco-
 
 226. See, e.g., Laura Alfaro et al., FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of 
Local Financial Markets, 64 J. INT‘L ECON. 89, 108 (2004); E. Borensztein et 
al., How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?, 45 J. INT‘L 
ECON. 115, 134 (1998). The effect appears to be most pronounced in countries 
that already had higher GDP. See Wu Jyun-Yi & Hsu Chih-Chiang, Does For-
eign Direct Investment Promote Economic Growth? Evidence from a Threshold 
Regression Analysis, 15 ECON. BULL. 1, 2 (2008). 
 227. Megan A. Torau & Ernest Goss, The Effects of Foreign Capital on 
State Economic Growth, 18 ECON. DEV. Q. 255, 266 (2004). 
 228. Id. at 263–65. 
 229. U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, supra note 100, at 5. 
 230. Id. at 7. 
 231. The measure for this variable is the percentage of each state‘s work-
force employed by foreign companies. For the source of data for this variable, 
see ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 225.  
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nomically efficient in a given state, a foreign company might 
prefer to operate in a state with a less restrictive, inefficient 
tort law (so long as it was more likely to be a defendant than a 
plaintiff). This test may therefore not be a reliable guide to the 
most efficient tort law, but it is a reasonable place to search for 
evidence of some economic effect from the state of such law. 
I adopt the same method as for the preceding studies, and 
the results are displayed in the following table. 
 
Table 7 
Effect of Tort Law on Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce 0.7374  
PRI  -0.0095 
Civil Law -0.4651 -0.4741 
Social Capital -0.9740 -0.8331 
Human Capital 0.1043 0.1128 
Urbanization -0.0143 -0.0149 
Government Size 0.1705 0.2613 
Ideology 0.0325 0.0321 
Manufacturing 0.0759 0.0782 
Constant -5.1449 -3.1387 
R-Squared 0.6162 0.5889 
 
There is no evidence for an effect of state tort law on for-
eign direct investments. The Chamber and PRI scores are in 
the direction of foreign investors preferring pro-defendant state 
law but are not statistically significant, nor are they substan-
tively material.  
The measures of manufacturing productivity and foreign 
direct investment provide no clear evidence for the effect of tort 
law. There is some suggestion of a negative effect from the 
Chamber measure, though it is weak. The PRI measure actual-
ly suggests that pro-plaintiff state tort law could benefit its 
economy. 
C. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
This Section considers the effect of state tort legal regimes 
on measures of state entrepreneurship. This may provide a 
more refined measure for the effect, as entrepreneurs may be 
especially susceptible to tort liability risk. Examination of 
small business may well be where the effects of state tort litiga-
 2011] ECONOMICS OF TORT REFORM 83 
 
tion are most likely to be found. A study conducted by National 
Economic Research Associates for the Chamber of Commerce 
has found that small businesses are especially vulnerable to lit-
igation risk.232 The small business share of commercial tort lia-
bility costs was substantially in excess of its share of business 
revenues.233 The liability cost per $1000 revenues for business-
es with revenue of less than $5 million could be twenty times 
greater than that for businesses with over $50 million in  
revenue.234 
Focusing on entrepreneurship could also capture the 
claimed anti-innovative effect of tort law in America.235 
Through classical Schumpeterian creative destruction, entre-
preneurship is the source of much innovation.236 Greater entre-
preneurship is also associated with more innovation, which in 
turn is associated with higher economic growth.237 Studying ef-
fects of tort law on entrepreneurship thus may capture the in-
novation effect as well as economic growth effects of the liabili-
ty system in a state. If pro-plaintiff tort law stimulates 
innovation, this might appear in the entrepreneurial measures. 
Entrepreneurship also provides a better metric for isolat-
ing the differential effects of state tort liability laws. Large 
companies operate throughout the entire nation, and their 
practices may well be driven, or at least influenced, by the na-
tion‘s most restrictive tort regime. Certainly, large states with 
many more potential plaintiffs will have a disproportionate ef-
fect on interstate businesses‘ calculations of whether to produce 
 
 232. See JUDYTH W. PENDELL, U.S. CHAMBER INSTIT. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
TORT LIABILITY COSTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS 7–8 (2007), available at http:// 
www.nera.com/extImage/PUB_ILR_tort_ May2007.pdf. 
 233. Id. at 6. 
 234. Id. at 10. 
 235. See Barton, supra note 93, at 301–02 (contending that entrepreneurial 
activity receives the innovation benefits of tort liability). 
 236. See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
viii (1985) (referring to entrepreneurship as ―the carrier of innovation‖). 
 237. See, e.g., Poh Kam Wong et al., Entrepreneurship, Innovation and 
Economic Growth: Evidence from GEM Data, 24 SMALL BUS. ECON. 335, 342–
44 (2005) (reporting statistical correlation between certain types of entrepre-
neurship and economic growth). Turbulence (the entry and exit of firms from 
the market) is associated with economic growth in the United States. Paul D. 
Reynolds, Creative Destruction: Source or Symptom of Economic Growth?, in 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND THE MAC-
ROECONOMY 97, 97 (Zoltan J. Acs et al. eds., 1999). Just having a greater 
number of competitors in the market may be associated with higher growth. 
Stephen J. Nickell, Competition and Corporate Performance, 104 J. POL. 
ECON. 724, 741 (1996). 
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a product or how to manufacture it. Small entrepreneurs, by 
contrast, have less interstate exposure and should be more in-
fluenced by the tort law of the state in which they operate. 
Consequently, entrepreneurship may offer the best test of the 
economic effects of a state‘s tort liability system.238 
Entrepreneurship theoretically could be measured in vari-
ous ways. One could consider the simple number of new enter-
prises registered by a state, but this will be distorted by other 
state law variables. For example, many entities choose to in-
corporate in Delaware, but this is presumably based upon the 
state‘s substantive corporate law or its relative judicial quality. 
For my tests, I use data from the Kauffman Foundation,239 
which has produced detailed state comparisons for several en-
trepreneurship measures. 
From this source, I consider the variables for initial public 
offerings (IPOs) as a share of worker earnings, total entrepre-
neurial activity (adjusted number of new businesses), and ven-
ture capital invested as a share of worker earnings.240 The first 
is a measure of highly successful entrepreneurship, the second 
a measure of overall entrepreneurship, and the third is an in-
termediate market measure of outside investors‘ assessment of 
the climate for entrepreneurial success. 
I first measure associations with intrastate IPOs. A very 
successful entrepreneurial business will wish to expand 
through the sale of shares to the public, which requires an IPO. 
To the degree that tort law influences a small business‘s pros-
pects for growth, this measure might capture its effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 238. This is not a perfect measure, as it is distorted by the interests of en-
trepreneurs, which may not align with those of society as a whole. If entrepre-
neurs are more likely to be defendants than plaintiffs, they may even prefer 
an inefficiently pro-defendant state of tort law. Entrepreneurship is very im-
portant to economic growth, though, so it provides a good proxy for this impor-
tant concern. 
 239. ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 225. 
 240. For a more detailed description of these measures, see id. at 32–33, 50. 
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Table 8 
Effect of Tort Law on Initial Public Offerings 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce -0.6304  
PRI  -0.0428 
Civil Law -0.1635 -0.1777 
Social Capital 0.1770 0.0719 
Human Capital 0.0323 -0.0233 
Urbanization 0.0229 0.0235 
Government Size 0.1282 0.0245 
Ideology -0.0221 -0.0187 
Manufacturing -0.0418 -0.0445 
Constant 5.0307 3.8517 
R-Squared 0.3988 0.3709 
 
From these results, there appears to be no association be-
tween state tort liability regimes and the frequency of initial 
public offerings. The PRI rating is in the expected direction but 
nowhere near statistical significance. The Chamber rating is in 
the opposite direction (pro-defendant law associated with fewer 
IPOs) but not statistically significant. 
The next assessment involves the Kauffman Foundation‘s 
evaluation of the total entrepreneurial activity in a state. This 
uses the same model as above, with reports in the following  
table. 
 
Table 9 
Effect of Tort Law on Entrepreneurial Activity 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce -0.0319  
PRI  -0.0050 
Civil Law -0.0085 -0.1653 
Social Capital 0.0095 0.0093 
Human Capital 0.0044 0.0033 
Urbanization -0.0018 0.0012 
Government Size -0.0060 -0.0200 
Ideology -0.0010 0.0001 
Manufacturing 0.0002 -0.0002 
Constant 0.4706 0.5897 
R-Squared 0.1499 0.1805 
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There is no identifiable association between entrepreneuri-
al activity and either of our measures of tort law. The PRI test 
is closer to suggesting an adverse effect of tort law (p = 0.23), 
but still well away from statistical significance. 
For yet another test of tort law‘s effect, I consider venture 
capital investing. Venture capitalists might well be more in-
formed of and attuned to state tort law that affects the success 
of those starting up entrepreneurial ventures. The following 
table reports the results of this analysis. 
 
Table 10 
Effect of Tort Law on Venture Capital 
 
 Chamber PRI 
Chamber of Commerce -0.3277  
PRI  -0.0015 
Civil Law 0.0280 0.0231 
Social Capital 0.0671 0.0108 
Human Capital 0.0318 0.0273 
Urbanization 0.0055 0.0058 
Government Size 0.0020 -0.0491 
Ideology -0.0001 0.0012 
Manufacturing 0.0001 -0.0012 
Constant 0.6208 -0.6098 
R-Squared 0.4456 0.3892 
 
The PRI estimate is not close to statistical significance. 
The Chamber measure is actually near statistical significance 
(p = 0.09), but in the direction of more pro-plaintiff law being 
associated with more venture capital investment. None of the 
other variables adds much to the assessment, though human 
capital is associated with more such investment in the model 
using the Chamber scores. Although there was reason to be-
lieve that entrepreneurs could be particularly sensitive to the 
state of local tort law, the analyses found little hint of such an 
effect.  
  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS   
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the evidence shows no 
negative economic effects from more pro-plaintiff tort law. 
While the Chamber measure showed no material association 
with the economic variables (although it was somewhat corre-
lated with higher insurance costs), there is a surprising associ-
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ation with the PRI variable measuring actual tort doctrines. 
More pro-plaintiff law is associated with higher economic 
growth. I ran separate regressions with individual doctrinal 
components of the measure, and they showed no such associa-
tion but the cumulative score is quite dramatic. Perhaps state 
law is too pro-defendant.  
As discussed above, it is theoretically plausible that more 
pro-plaintiff tort law could be economically beneficial. If so, one 
would expect more profound effects to be found where the law 
was most pro-defendant. This can be detected through a tech-
nique known as quantile regression.241 I tested this at three le-
vels, the 25th percentile (more pro-defendant), the 50th percen-
tile (median) and the 75th percentile (more pro-plaintiff), with 
the results reported in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 
Quantile Regression of PRI Scale and Economic Growth 
 
 Coefficient Probability 
25th percentile 0.9128 0.0003 
50th percentile 0.7263 0.0470 
75th percentile 0.6778 0.1470 
 
The results provide some support for the conclusion that 
pro-plaintiff law benefits the economy. At the level of states 
with more pro-defendant law, the results are highly significant, 
but for states with more pro-plaintiff law, statistical signifi-
cance disappears. Moreover, the size of the coefficient steadily 
decreases as law becomes more pro-plaintiff. Even at the 75th 
percentile, though, there is still a positive association. 
The analyses provide inconclusive findings on the effects of 
tort law on the economy. The findings on the association of PRI 
scores with state GDP growth are strong and significant, but 
there is reason to doubt them. The PRI scores did not associate 
with the output category of insurance costs, which would likely 
be the route through which tort law hampered economic 
growth.  
However, it is possible that the positive economic effects of 
tort law might not appear as higher insurance costs if the antic-
ipation of such higher insurance costs caused business to alter 
 
 241. For a discussion of quantile regression, see generally ROGER KOENK-
ER, QUANTILE REGRESSION (2005). 
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their behavior to avoid such higher insurance costs. As with the 
international growth evidence, many significant associations 
will prove spurious and not robust to different time periods or 
control variables.242 Moreover, given the nature of statistical 
significance, some associations will appear by random chance 
variation rather than a true association.  
There are also other possible problems with the PRI asso-
ciation. The correlation was between the state of tort law and 
growth for the prior ten years, which relies on a premise that 
tort law was stable over this time, which is not established. As 
with any correlation, there is a possible directionality prob-
lem—it may be that economic growth produces more pro-
plaintiff tort law regimes, rather than the hypothesized effect. 
Perhaps economic growth makes judges more complacent and 
causes them to create more pro-plaintiff tort law doctrines. 
It may be meaningful that the Chamber of Commerce 
scores showed no significant association with the economic var-
iables, except for manufacturing productivity, for which more 
pro-plaintiff law was economically better. As the Chamber 
notes, business decisions are presumably grounded in percep-
tions of businesspersons.243 The perceptions measured by the 
Chamber do not track either the actual law measured by PRI or 
the hypothesized economic effects. The lack of association be-
tween the Chamber‘s perception measure and the PRI‘s actual 
measure also raises questions about the findings on the effect 
of PRI‘s assessment of tort law on the economy. If businessper-
sons do not perceive the state of tort law accurately, it seems 
less likely that the true state of the law would have a substan-
tial impact on business decisions. 
The general insignificance of the control variables may also 
be reason to question the results. While I have employed the 
control variables most expected to be predictive of my depen-
dent variables, some other unmeasured variable may be ex-
plaining the results. For this to be true, though, that unknown 
variable would have to be one that is very highly correlated 
with the PRI score. 
Yet another possibility is that the economic costs of tort re-
gimes may be largely exported to other states, which would ob-
scure any association in a study of the states.244 Costs imposed 
 
 242. See supra Part V.B (discussing the effects of tort liability on foreign 
investment and international economic growth). 
 243. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 141, at 101. 
 244. I attempted to adjust for this with my measures for entrepreneurial 
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by the tort system of one state may be felt directly by business-
es of another state, and lawyers may adapt to state law differ-
ences by forum shopping.245 If this were the case, the effects of 
state legal differences might not appear in state economies, 
even if the legal differences were having some economic effect. 
Such a result might counsel for national action, though this 
case also remains unproved. 
Consequently, there are reasons to doubt the findings on 
the effect of the PRI measure and state economic growth. How-
ever, the association is an especially strong one, so it should not 
be cavalierly dismissed either. The quantile regression provides 
some additional support for the conclusion, suggesting that fur-
ther investigation is warranted. Nor does this isolated associa-
tion provide conclusive evidence that pro-plaintiff tort law ben-
efits the economy, given the lack of significant results in other 
regressions. However, the finding is powerful evidence that tort 
law is at least not harming the states‘ economies.246 With such 
a strong relationship between pro-plaintiff tort law and eco-
nomic growth, it is difficult to imagine some unmeasured factor 
that could reverse such a relationship. 
 
activity, on the presumption that these effects would have a greater intrastate 
effect, but this presumption may be incorrect. 
 245. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442 
(2008) (noting that ―plaintiffs‘ lawyers react to changes that make litigation 
more difficult in one court system by moving their cases to other court sys-
tems, while defense counsel seek forum advantages for their clients by using 
the tools available to them to affect the site of litigation‖). 
 246. This contrary result is sometimes known as a ―backfire‖ effect and 
provides the strongest evidence of no positive effect. See David Weisburd et al., 
When Can We Conclude that Treatments or Programs ―Don’t Work‖?, 587 AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 31, 42 (2003). 
